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THE BIG BANKS: BACKGROUND, DEREGULATION,
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, AND "Too BIG TO FAL"
CHARLES W. MURDOCKt
ABSTRACT
The U.S. economy is still reeling from the financial crisis that ex-
ploded in the fall of 2008. This Article asserts that the big banks were
major culprits in causing the crisis by funding the non-bank lenders that
created the toxic mortgages, which the big banks securitized and sold to
unwary investors. Ironically, banks that were then too big to fail are even
larger today.
The Article briefly reviews the history of banking from the Found-
ing Fathers to the deregulatory mindset that has been present since 1980.
It then traces the impact of deregulation, which led to the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s and the current financial crisis. Prior to deregula-
tion, the country had gone fifty years without a financial crisis. The Arti-
cle briefly examines the causes of the crisis and analyzes in depth the
financial innovation, such as adjustable-rate mortgages and credit default
swaps, that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan extolled but that led us
into a near financial meltdown. It traces the growth of the big banks and
asserts that breaking them up would improve efficiency, permit risk to be
priced appropriately, increase competition, and eliminate many conflicts
of interest, including those of management who pursue greater financial
rewards by ignoring the potential for catastrophic risk. It also asserts that
regulation cannot be left in the hands of regulators who do not believe in
regulation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If they're too big to fail, they're too big.
-Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan'
When former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan made the
above comment, some listeners were shocked. However, if Greenspan
were viewed as a true conservative, such an approach should not be
shocking because, until the Reagan Administration in 1980, conserva-
tives generally were strong advocates of antitrust enforcement and
viewed excessive size and power with suspicion.2 On the other hand,
until he recently "got religion,"3 Greenspan was more a libertarian than a
1. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the C. Peter McColough Series on
International Economics: The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences (Oct. 15 2009),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20417/c_peter mecolough series on international economics.htmi.
2. See Republican Party Platform of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid-25842#axzzl W4javJKZ (last visited Jan. 5,
2013) ("We will press on for greater competition in our economy. The energetic antitrust program of
the past four years demonstrates our commitment to free competition as our basic policy. The Anti-
trust Division has moved decisively to invalidate those 'conglomerate' mergers which stifle competi-
tion and discourage economic concentration. The 87 antitrust cases filed in fiscal year 1972 broke
the previous one-year record of more than a decade ago, during another Republican Administra-
tion. . . . Small business, so vital to our economic system, is free enterprise in its purest sense. It
holds forth opportunity to the individual, regardless of race or color, to fulfill the American dream.
The seedbed of innovation and invention, it is the starting point of many of the country's large
businesses, and today its rol[e] in our increasingly technological economy is crucial. We pledge to
sustain and expand that role.").
3. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address to the Economic Club of New York 3
(Feb. 17, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/EconClub.PDF ("But in August
2007, the risk management structure cracked. All of the sophisticated mathematics and computer
wizardry essentially rested on one central premise: that enlightened self interest of owners and
managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against insolvency
by actively monitoring and managing their firms' capital and risk positions. When in the summer of
2007 that premise failed, I was deeply dismayed. I still believe that self regulation is an essential tool
for market effectiveness-a first line of defense. But, it is clear that the levels of complexity to
which market practitioners, at the height of their euphoria, carried risk-management techniques and
risk-product design were too much for even the most sophisticated market players to handle properly
and prudently. Accordingly, I see no alternative to a set of heightened federal regulatory rules for
banks and other financial institutions.").
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conservative, and it was his libertarian instincts that were part of the
cause of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007 and 2008, and contin-
ues through today. Besides the lack of regulation embodied in Green-
span's philosophy, another major cause of the crisis was the greed and
incompetence of the big banks. These banks financed the non-bank
mortgage companies that generated many of the toxic loans, which were
then securitized into toxic securities by the big banks and sold to unwary
investors. The incompetence continued as Jamie Dimon initially charac-
terized J.P. Morgan's potential $9 billion4 trading loss as a "tempest in a
teapot."5 What has transpired is that profits have been privatized but
losses have been socialized.
When President Barack Obama took office, monthly job losses ex-
ceeded 700,000 jobs, and a worldwide economic collapse had been
averted only by the prior action of the Bush Administration in arranging
a $700 billion bailout of financial and other systemically important insti-
tutions.6 But the $700 billion was only the tip of the iceberg in terms of
the financial assistance provided to the big banks. Bloomberg reported
that the federal government pledged over $12.8 trillion to avoid a finan-
cial meltdown.7 President Obama then undertook an inadequate stimulus
package in an attempt to restart the rest of the economy but thereafter
turned his focus to health care.
A macro approach to the causes of the financial crisis was not un-
dertaken until comprehensive legislation, namely the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, was finally enacted in July
2010.8 Although this legislation probably would have precluded the cur-
rent financial crisis by requiring originators to implement mortgage-
underwriting standards, by requiring securitizers to have some skin in the
game, and by exposing credit-rating agencies to liability, it may not pre-
4. Ambereen Choudbury & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Slips on Report Trading Loss Wid-
ened to $9 Billion, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2012, 7:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2012-
06-28/jpmorgan-slips-on-report-of-trading-loss-widening-to-9-billion.html.
5. Jonathon Weil, What Jamie Dimon Doesn't Know Is Plain Scary, BLOOMBERG (May 11,
2012, 8:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-1 1/what-jamie-dimon-doesn-t-know-is-
plain-scary.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was passed by
the Senate on October 1, 2008 and by the House on October 3, 2008, and signed into law by Presi-
dent Bush on October 3, 2008. Id.; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Signs
HR 1424 Into Law (Oct. 3, 2008), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081003-17.html.
. 7. Mark Pittman & Bob Ivry, Financial Rescue Nears GDP as Pledges Top 12.8 Trillion,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2009, 2:20 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=armOzfkwtCA4.
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
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vent future crises because it did not adequately address the power of the
big banks and their culture of risk taking.9
Part II of this Article is a short history of the attitude toward large
banks and their power in this country, from the time of our Founding
Fathers to the present. It first looks at the period up to the Great Depres-
sion, during which, for the most part, banking power was viewed with
suspicion. The Article then examines the impact of inflationary and other
pressures of the 1970s upon banking, which then led to deregulation un-
der President Ronald Reagan in 1980 and in the following years. Part III
examines the causes of the financial crisis and the aftermath of the crisis,
which has devastated our economy. Part IV examines financial innova-
tion, which was extolled by Chairman Greenspan, but which in large part
led to the current financial crisis. Part V examines the growth of the "too
big to fail" banks, the impact of too big to fail on competition and the
creation of financial innovations. Finally, the Article examines proposals
to limit their size and the benefits of breaking up the big banks, including
less complexity, better monitoring by the markets and creditors, and re-
duced conflicts of interest. The Article concludes that it was the failure
of the banking system, not business cyclicality, that led to our depressed
economy, and that the approach in Dodd-Frank does not adequately deal
with the problem of too big to fail. The mega banks need to be down-
sized, voluntarily or by legislation, to create entities that are manageable,
transparent, and able to assess risk properly. Moreover, we need to
change the mentality that government is the problem, not the solution.
The "Appendix," in Part VII, provides a history of the consolidation ac-
tivity of the big banks.
II. SHORT HISTORY OF BANKING: How WE GOT TO "Too BIG TO FAIL"
A. Founding Fathers to 1980
Going back to our Founding Fathers, there has been concern about
the nature of our banking system and the potential for abuse arising from
the power of banks. Alexander Hamilton favored a publicly chartered
bank similar to the Bank of England, and Congress passed legislation in
1791 to create a bank with a twenty-year charter.'0 However, Thomas
Jefferson was deeply suspicious of banks and lobbied President George
Washington to veto the legislation." A brief by Hamilton convinced
9. See generally Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64
SMU L. REV. 1243, 1250-51 (2011) (analyzing the likelihood of success or failure of the Dodd-
Frank legislation at preventing future financial crises).
10. See I JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 88-89
(2002); Hamilton vs. Jefferson, COUNTRY STUDIES, http://countrystudies.us/united-states/history-
41.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
I1. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 89-90.
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Washington to sign the legislation.' 2 Later, however, the charter of the
First Bank was allowed to expire.
After the War of 1812, it became clear that a national bank was
needed, particularly to provide funding for war.13 Legislation creating the
Second Bank of the United States, again with a twenty-year charter, was
adopted in 1816 and signed into law by President James Madison. 14
Nicholas Biddle was in charge of the bank and alienated Andrew Jack-
son, who was elected president in 1828 because he used the bank's eco-
nomic power to curry, favor with members of Congress. Jackson was a
believer in a strong presidency and thought that the Second Bank's mo-
nopoly over government finances gave Biddle and his friends undue
profits and power. Jackson is reported to have said, "The bank is trying
to kill me, . . . but I will kill it!"" He vetoed the recharter bill on the ba-
sis that the bank enjoyed undue economic privilege.'
Jackson's opponent in the 1832 election was Henry Clay, who was
aligned with Biddle and sought to renew the Second Bank's charter four
years early to make it an issue in the presidential campaign. Jackson
again won the presidency, and thus his prior veto was not overturned.
Biddle sought to retaliate. According to one commentator, Biddle's ac-
tions demonstrated that Jackson's fear of the power of the Second Bank
was well founded:
When Jackson began transferring the federal government's deposits
out of the Second Bank to his favored "pet banks," the Second Bank
demanded payment of bills issued by state banks and reduced its
loans by over $5 million, contracting the money supply and causing
interest rates to double to 12 percent. Biddle hoped, by damaging the
economy, to stir up opposition to Jackson; in the process, he showed
that Jackson had not been wrong to fear the power of a major bank to
distort the economy for its own purposes.17
Even though there was no central bank, the state banking system
rapidly expanded, and industry experienced incredible growth during the
rest of the nineteenth century notwithstanding the disruption of the Civil
War. Some would say that industry grew too big because the last couple
of decades of the nineteenth century were the Gilded Age, or the age of
trusts;18 this in turn led to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of
12. See Letters Between Alexander Hamilton & George Washington (1791), in HAMILTON
AND THE NATIONAL DEBT 71-78 (George Rogers Taylor ed., 1950).
13. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, WHITE HOUSE BURNING 3-7 (2012).
14. See RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 28-33 (1993) (discussing the Second Bank generally).
15. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 20 (2010).
16. Id
17. Id.
18. See generally D.C. Shouter, Part II: America in the Gilded Age, CLASSIFICATION OF AM.
WEALTH, http://www.raken.com/american-wealth/trusts/the-trustsl.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2013)
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1890,19 and subsequent "trust busting" by President Theodore Roose-
velt. 20
The rise of the trusts was funded by the investment bankers, the
most powerful of whom was John Pierpont Morgan. His arrogance and
power were reflected in his alleged statements to President Roosevelt: "If
we have done anything wrong, send your man to my man, and they can
fix it up."21
Roosevelt's trust busting was interrupted by the Panic of 1907,
which was triggered by an attempt by insiders and their bankers to ma-
nipulate the stock price of United Copper Company.22 When the attempt
failed, it triggered a run on those banks involved in the scheme and then
spread to other banks. To satisfy their customers' demand for deposits,
the banks were forced to sell assets, thus pushing down their stock prices
and exacerbating the situation in a manner similar to what we have expe-
rienced in this current crisis. Because there was no central bank available
to step in and provide credit to the banks, J.P. Morgan tried to stem the
tide by providing credit. Unfortunately, at least for some banks, because
he could not muster enough funds to save all the banks, in effect Morgan
decided which banks would survive and which would not. However,
even Morgan's actions did not stem the tide, and the federal government
provided $25 million to New York banks to provide the necessary liquid-
23ity.
The Panic brought both bankers and industry in general to the reali-
zation that there was a need for a central bank. Understandably, what the
bankers wanted from a central bank was an entity that could bail out
banks when they were in trouble; they certainly did not want more regu-
lation. However, the Pujo committee concluded that control of credit was
in the hands of a small number of Wall Street bankers who had consider-
able economic power.24 Louis Brandeis, who was an adviser to President
Woodrow Wilson, was also leery of the power of big banks and favored
stronger regulation.25 Unfortunately, the compromise bill that passed in
(discussing the rising concentration of wealth in the United States during the late nineteenth centu-
ry).
19. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 363.
20. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (2002).
21. EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 91 (2002).
22. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 27-31.
23. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE
RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 123 24 (1990).
24. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 48; LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 49 (Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press 1995)
(1914). The Pujo Committee was a subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and Curren-
cy, which, in 1912-1913, investigated the ties between financial leaders and major industrial compa-
nies that had consolidated control in a few hands. BRANDEIS, supra, at 24.
25. See BRANDEIS, supra note 24, at 18-19, 22 23.
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191326 gave the banks access to public funds when needed but was not
particularly strong on the regulatory side. Although the first chief execu-
tive officer of the Federal Reserve Board of New York, Benjamin
Strong, was allied with J.P. Morgan,2 7 he is generally regarded as having
been a good chairman, even though he did not stem the credit that was
leading to the Great Depression.
Because of the implicit government guarantee and weak regulation,
banks were able to provide cheap money for the speculation that led to
the market crash of 1929. President Franklin Roosevelt, Teddy Roose-
velt's cousin, was elected president in 1932 and quickly shepherded the
Glass-Steagall Act through Congress in 1933.28 One of the major provi-
sions of this Act was to separate investment banking and commercial
banking. Commercial banks were protected against depositor runs by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) but, in return, were sub-
jected to strict federal regulation. This regulatory regime provided ap-
proximately fifty years without a serious financial crisis. See Figure 1
below.
26. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (2006)).
27. Russ Roberts & Barry Eichengreen, Eichengreen on the Dollar and International Fi-
nance, ECONTALK, at 33:02, (June 6, 2011),
http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/06/eichengreenon.html.
28. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 24, 78, 377-78 (1994)) (repealed 1999).
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Figure 1. Bank Failures and Suspensions, 1864-2008
(with data on deposits starting in 1921)
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Charts, HARV. Bus. SCH. (Dec. 14, 2009), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edulcdn-media/fcic-
testimony/2009-lll6-Moss-charts.pdf
Although the banking system was not perfect, and there were flaws
that needed correction, the mindset on regulation dramatically changed in
1980 when President Reagan uttered his often repeated phrase "govern-
ment is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem." 2 9
B. 1980-2007: Deregulation and the Dominance ofFinance
1. Prelude: Changing Times in the 1970s
The 1930s were the era of depression; the early 1940s were the era
of war; and the period from the end of World War II to the 1970s was the
era of prosperity and the growth of the middle class. 30 The contrast be-
tween this period and the period following deregulation in the 1980s and
thereafter is illustrated by Figure 2 below:
29. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, 121 CONG. REC. 151 (1981)
30. Robert B. Reich, Op-Ed., The Limping Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR6.
0
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Figure 2. The Great Prosperity and the Great Regression
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Source: Robert B. Reich, Op-Ed., The Limping Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR6.
Education and technological innovation, not financial innovation,
drove this new prosperity. Banking was boring, giving rise to the 3-6-3
caricature: borrow at 3%, lend at 6%, and hit the golf course by 3
o'clock. Both commercial and investment banking were effective in fun-
neling capital to industry. Moreover, governmental programs made home
ownership a reality for most Americans3' and were responsible for the
growth in higher education.3 2
At this time, investment banks were partnerships.33 Because invest-
ment bankers were personally liable, they had their own wealth at risk,
not just that of other people. This created a more conservative mindset.
31. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (2006)).
32. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1070A (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (providing federal Pell grants to
students of institutions of higher education); 38 U.S.C. § 3001-3035 (2006) (providing education
benefits to veterans); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (repealed
1981); 38 C.F.R. §§ 21.1029-21.9770 (2009) (providing education benefits to veterans and their
dependents).
33. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1173, 1177-78
(2010) ("Until the 1980s, most investment banks were general partnerships run by partners who
were personally liable for the debts of their firms. A partner of Lehman Brothers did not want or
need the government to tell him how to run his business; if the business failed, the partner paid.").
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Bankers' compensation was comparable to that of other private sector
jobs.34
Although this was an era of unmatched general prosperity, this is
not to say that all was well. Not only were there the Korean and Vietnam
Wars but also there was the Cold War, or nuclear detente with Russia,
carrying with it the fear of a nuclear holocaust. Nevertheless, government
funded innovation, which was transferred to industry, and industry in
turn invested in domestic jobs," median income grew,36 unions were
powerful,37 and the top average pay of a chief executive officer (CEO)
was only about twenty-five times that of the average worker. 38 This ratio
of CEO pay to worker pay surged in the 1990s, and in the 2000s had
39increased to as much as 531 times the average worker pay.
Then came the uncertainty of the 1970s. Upon being elected in
1968, President Richard Nixon was confronted with a recession 40 and
scandals in the securities markets41 that, in part, led to a two-tiered stock
market.42 Large-capitalization stocks did well, but small-capitalization
stocks were pummeled, leading to the going-private phenomenon of the
mid-1970s.43 Nixon experimented with price controls, and, when he took
the lid off, prices soared," also sparked by the OPEC oil embargo.45
34. JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 15, at 115 fig.4.
35. See generally CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY 55-61,
66-69 (2010) (discussing the U.S. government's rejection of laissez-faire economics and investment
in major industries and innovations from the Civil War through World War II as a driving force
behind economic growth).
36. See Reich, supra note 30.
37. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 137-39 (1952).
38. Lawrence Mishel, CEO-to-Worker Pay Imbalance Grows, ECON. POL'Y INST. (June 21,
2006), http://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures-snapshots20060621/ (demonstrating that in
1965, CEOs earned about twenty-five times more than an average worker);
39. See Eric Wahlgren, Spreading the Yankee Way ofPay, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2001),
http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/apr200l/ca20010419_812.htm (offering a global
perspective on the recent historical increase in CEO pay).
40. See generally Transcript of Interview by PBS Commanding Heights with Paul Volcker,
Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve 3-7 (Sept. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Volcker Interview],
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/pdf/int paulvolcker.pdf (chronicling
Volcker's views on the recession that greeted President Nixon when he took office, the surprising
inflation that followed, and the imposition of wage and price controls, as well as the "stagflation"-
inflation coupled with a stagnant economy-that confronted President Carter).
41. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1971) (discuss-
ing company officers who, after learning of a significant find, misrepresented the results of testing at
the site while making large purchases of company stock).
42. Lewis D. Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Control,
42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 762 (1973) (describing the two-tiered market as one "in which institu-
tional security favorites enjoy ever mounting prices, while other companies languish at low price-
earnings multiples").
43. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm'r, SEC, Law Advisory Council Lecture at the Notre Dame Law
School: "Going Private"; A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility 4-6, 8, I1, 13 (Nov. 14, 1974).
44. Volcker Interview, supra note 40, at 3-5.
45. Arabs Threaten Oil Embargo in Week ifDemand Isn't Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1971, at
DIO.
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At this time, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
moved to modernize the securities industry. Institutions such as pension
funds and mutual funds, which had grown as a result of the country's
overall prosperity, chafed at the fixed commission structure of the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).46 If you traded 100,000 shares, you paid
about 1,000 times as much commission as if you traded 100 shares. Alt-
hough this was arguably inefficient, it had one salutary effect: institu-
tions were investors rather than traders. And commercial banks could not
trade because of Glass-Steagall. Twenty million shares were a good trad-
ing day on the NYSE.47 This all changed with the elimination of fixed
commissions by the Securities Act Amendments of 1975. * The average
trading volume the past few years has been about 1.5 billion shares a
day, but on October 10, 2008, it reached over 7 billion shares.49
Also, at this time, Republicans were the party of small business: this
meant they believed in effective antitrust enforcement.50 The Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964 introduced a regime of public disclosure to
the over-the-counter (OTC) market. 1 Prior to this development, if you
wanted to do due diligence in an acquisition, you needed to bargain for it
in a negotiated transaction. But with public disclosure of financial and
business information in the OTC market, hostile takeovers, sometimes
referred to as "overhead tender offers," became a prudent opportunity.52
46. See In the Midst of Revolution: the SEC, 1973-1981, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/rev/revO2c.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
47. See NYSE Daily Share Volume 1970 Through 1979, NYSE Statistics Archive, N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE, http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/stats/vol70-79.dat (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
48. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 4, 89 Stat. 97, 107 (1975).
49. See NYSE Group Volume Records-Top 10 Days, NYSE Statistics Archive, N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer edition.asp?mode=table&key-3007&catego
ry-3 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (showing over 7 billion shares traded on October 10, 2008); see also
Daily Market Summary, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.nyse.com/financials/1108407157455.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (showing a sample
day from April 2011 with nearly 1.5 billion shares traded); NYSE Statistics Archive, N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE, http://www.nyse.com/financials/l 143717022567.html (follow "Historical NYSE Eu-
ronext Volume" hyperlink; then see "Monthly US Volumes" tab) (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (dividing
Handled Volume by Trading Days for each month equals about 1.5 billion shares per day). On one
recent day, 236,314,500 shares of just one stock, Bank of America, were traded. Most Active New
York Stock Exchange-traded Stocks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9PG02Q8I.htm.
50. See Republican Party Platform of 1972, supra note 2.
51. Act of August 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 6, 78 Stat. 565, 570.
52. When one company seeks to acquire another, it wants to ensure that it knows what it is
buying. Prior to the 1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, companies generally engaged
in negotiated transactions in which an agreement was executed that, prior to closing, enabled the
acquirer to do due diligence. In addition, extensive representations and warranties were included in
the acquisition agreement, the breach of which would either excuse closing or provide a cause of
action. After the amendments created some 10,000 OTC companies that were required to file annual,
quarterly, and current reports, an acquirer, who was thwarted by management of a target corporation
that would not enter into a negotiated transaction, could make an "overhead tender offer" directly to
the shareholders. Now, in such a situation, the acquiring company would not be flying blind because
of the public availability of information.
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Although acquisitions increased, merger mania had not yet begun. Anti-
trust was still something to be reckoned with.
2. 1980-2000 Deregulation: The Savings and Loan Crisis, "Green-
spanomics," and Squelching Derivative Regulation
Economic stagnation, historically high interest rates, and inflation
characterized the 1970s. The Iranian hostage crisis was the last straw,
and President Reagan turned President Jimmy Carter into a one-term
president in the 1980 election. Reagan's goal was to restore prosperity by
getting government off peoples' backs." A major tool was deregula-
tion."
Inflation was problematic for savings and loan institutions. In effect,
they had their assets long and liabilities short; for example, on the asset
side of the balance sheet, the savings and loan association (S&L) had a
thirty-year mortgage yielding 6%, but by 1980, on the liability side, some
certificates of deposit were commanding 12% or more. Whereas in It's
A Wonderful Life Jimmy Stewart was able in 1946 to explain where the
depositor's money had gone, depositors in the 1980s were not appeased
by the fact that their mortgage interest was at 6%; they wanted a market
rate of return on their certificates of deposit.
Deregulation actually began under President Carter. At the end of
his term, the Depository Institutions Deregilation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 was passed.56 The Regulation Q limit on the interest that
could be paid on traditional savings accounts was phased out and banks
could now compete with money market funds," government bonds,
and other investment vehicles. The Act also expanded the permissible
range of investments by S&Ls 59 and preempted state usury laws. 60
53. See Reagan, supra note 29.
54. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Garn-St. Germain Depository (Oct.
15, 1982), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edularchives/speeches/ 982/101582b.htm.
55. See, e.g., Eric N. Berg, Bowery Savings Bank Is Sold for $200 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 1987, at Al ("Beginning in the early 1980's, in a story replayed at thrift institutions nationwide,
the Bowery fell onto hard times as interest earnings from its portfolio of old, low-paying, fixed-rate
mortgages were inadequate to finance high-rate deposits.").
56. Depository Institutions.Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (2006)).
57. See Money Market Funds, SEC.Gov, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmnkt.htm (last
modified Sept. 9, 2009).
58. In the 1980s, I was retained as an expert by the attorney for an elderly and poorly educat-
ed widow who had $100,000 from her husband's estate to invest. Her broker put her in a variety of
risky securities. The expert for the broker opined that it was necessary to buy risky securities to meet
her objective of receiving $12,000 a year to live on. In my testimony I pointed out that U.S. Treasury
bonds were paying 12% in 1980, when the broker invested her savings. The broker settled and gave
her money back.
59. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 401, 94
Stat. at 151-55.
60. See id. § 501, 94 Stat. 161-62.
516 [Vol. 90:2
THE BIG BANKS AND "TOO BIG TO FAIL"
Under President Reagan, the Controller of Currency (OCC) in 1981
authorized national banks to offer adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs),
and Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982, which further enabled savings and loan institutions to expand
their lending activities into commercial lending and even junk bonds.62
The Act also authorized state-chartered banks to issue ARMs,63 putting
them on parity with national banks, and gave the OCC the authority to
lift restrictions on loan-to-value ratios, maturities, and amortization
schedules. The Controller exercised this authority the following year.
Although President Reagan hailed deregulation, 6 5 it led to the col-
lapse of thousands of savings and loans and a federal bailout of about
$160 billion,66 as well as the Keating Five scandal, in which Charles
Keating, the former CEO of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, went
to jail, but the highly publicized charges against Senator McCain were
dropped.6 7 The impact of deregulation on the savings and loan industry
was summarized in History of the Eighties-Lessons for the Future:
Most political, legislative, and regulatory decisions in the early
1980s were imbued with a spirit of deregulation. The prevailing view
was that S&Ls should be granted regulatory forbearance until interest
rates returned to normal levels, when thrifts would be able to restruc-
ture their portfolios with new asset powers. To forestall actual insol-
vency, therefore, the [Federal Home Loan Bank Board] lowered net
worth requirements for federally insured savings and loan associa-
tions from 5 percent of insured accounts to 4 percent in November
1980 and to 3 percent in January 1982. At the same time, the existing
20-year phase-in rule for meeting the net worth requirement, and the
5-year-averaging rule for computing the deposit base, were retained.
The phase-in rule meant that S&Ls less than 20 years old had capital
requirements even lower than 3 percent. This made chartering de no-
vo federal stock institutions very attractive because the required $2.0
million initial capital investment could be leveraged into $1.3 billion
in assets by the end of the first year in operation. The 5-year-
averaging rule, too, encouraged rapid deposit growth at S&Ls, be-
61. See Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (Mar. 27, 1981).
62. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.
63. See id. § 801, 96 Stat. at 1545-46.
64. See Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698 (Sept. 9, 1983) (codified
as amended at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34).
65. See Reagan, supra note 54.
66. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S
AND EARLY 1990s, at 169 (1997).
67. See Times Topics: Keating Five, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/keating_five/index.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2013); see also Tom Fitzpatrick, McCain: The Most Reprehensible of the Keating
Five, PHOENIX NEWTIMES NEWS, Nov. 29, 1989, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/1989-11-
29/news/mccain-the-most-reprehensible-of-the-keating-five/.
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cause the net worth requirement was based not on the institution's
existing deposits but on the average of the previous five years.68
One way to alleviate the banking conundrum of having assets long
and liabilities short would be to enable banks to get the long assets, such
as thirty-year mortgages, off their books by selling them, thus converting
them to cash and enabling further lending. But, if the mortgage can be
sold without recourse (i.e., without any liability on the seller in the event
of default by the borrower), there is the problem of moral hazard because
the lender, not having the risk of loss, could be indifferent to the credit-
worthiness of the borrower. This is what happened in the 2000s.
The Government National Mortgage Association, a federal agen-
cy,6 9 first securitized mortgages. It would buy mortgages, combine them
in pools, and then sell securities backed by the pools. These were pristine
mortgage-backed securities in that the securities that were issued each
had an undivided interest in the pool of mortgages. Tranching the pools
and creating priorities of payment was yet to come.70
The investment banks wanted to get into the securitization game but
were stymied by state regulations and concerns about the taxation of
these securitized instruments. However, the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 198471 and the Tax Reform Act of 198672 eliminat-
ed these concerns, and the investment banks became players, eventually
the most significant players, in securitizing mortgages.
This period also reflected a blurring of the lines between investment
banking and commercial banking. Commercial banks sought to under-
write securities, and investment banks sought to emulate savings and
checking accounts. The investment banks accomplished the latter by
creating cash management accounts that provided customers with check-
writing privileges against their accounts with the investment bank, thus
competing directly with the savings and commercial banks. Investment
banks also competed indirectly with savings and loan associations and
commercial banks by funding the non-bank lenders or mortgage bankers.
Because these "non-banks" received funds from commercial lenders ra-
ther than from depositors, they escaped the regulation to which the com-
mercial banks and S&Ls were subject. On the other hand, commercial
banks, as a first step, sold commercial paper for their corporate clients.
After litigation73 ultimately upheld this practice, the Federal Reserve (the
68. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 66, at 173 (footnotes omitted).
69. Act of August 1, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 536 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1717 (2006)).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
71. Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
72. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 671, 100 Stat. 2085, 2309-18 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 860A-G
(2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
73. See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Govemors, 468 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1984); Sec. Indus.
Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Simon Kwan, Cracking the
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Fed), in a series of rulings, undercut the Glass-Steagall prohibition on
underwriting by commercial banks.74
The Fed, under Alan Greenspan from 1987 to 2006, eschewed regu-
lation, and when the Fed expanded the percentage of revenue that banks
could earn from the securities operation of their subsidiaries from 10% to
25%, the demise of Glass-Steagall was well underway. Ultimately, Pres-
ident Bill Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which
enabled financial holding companies to engage in financial and ancillary
activities, including banking, insurance, and securities.75 Glass-Steagall
was no more.76
In the Clinton Administration, financial deregulation became the
norm. Deregulation was also the norm for the Fed during the years that it
was led by Alan Greenspan. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 basically
eliminated restrictions on interstate banking.77 On the other hand, also in
1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act,
which amended the Truth in Lending Act to provide that credit should
not be extended "without regard to the consumers' repayment ability,
including the consumers' current and expected income, current obliga-
tions, and employment."7 8 In other words, predatory lending was prohib-
ited. However, in 1998, the.Federal Reserve Board decided not to "con-
duct consumer compliance examinations of, nor to investigate consumer
complaints regarding, nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies."79 Had the Fed enforced the provision of the Truth in Lending Act
that credit not be extended to those who did not have the ability to repay,
we would not have had the plethora of "liars' loans" that, in part, led to
the financial crisis.
The most foolhardy example of a deregulatory mindset occurred
with respect to derivatives. Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), foresaw the risks that these in-
struments posed to the economy and sought to regulate them. However,
the Clinton Administration, led by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and
Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers joined with Alan Greenspan
Glass-Steagall Barriers, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. ECON. LETTER 97-08 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F.,
S.F., Cal.), Mar. 21, 1997, available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el97-08.html.
74. CHARLES R. GEISST, UNDUE INFLUENCE: HOW THE WALL STREET ELITE PUT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AT RISK 223, 245, 249 (2005); Kwan, supra note 73.
75. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1342 (1999).
76. Interestingly, the drive for the repeal of Glass-Steagall was the acquisition by Citicorp of
Travelers Insurance because Glass-Steagall would have required the new Citigroup to be broken up.
Paradoxically, Citigroup eventually spun off Travelers's insurance business.
77. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, § 101, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339 (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
78. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 152(d), 108
Stat. 2160, 2190-91, 2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h)).
79. See Binyamin Appelbaum, As Subprime Lending Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn't
Bother Barking, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at Al.
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to derail her proposal.o Ms. Born's proposals were not that onerous:
basically, she wanted more transparency and a requirement of reserves to
cushion losses.
Consider American International Group (AIG), a multinational in-
surance company. The "quants" 8 who developed credit default swaps
(CDSs) 82 believed there was a 99% probability that AIG would never
need to pay out on them.83 Consequently, AIG maintained no loss re-
serves for these instruments. Accordingly, when the subprime mortgage
market collapsed, AIG did not have the funds to honor its credit guaran-
tees, and the federal government was stuck with a $135 billion bailout of
AIG. But the people who were sold CDSs were rewarded handsomely
with millions in commissions and other compensation.
Unfortunately, Larry Summers argued that Born's proposals would
lead to a financial crisis. Greenspan, Rubin, and Arthur Levitt, then
Chairman of the SEC, convinced Congress to bar Ms. Born's attempt to
regulate derivatives. The following year, Senator Phil Gramm attached a
rider to an 11,000-page appropriations bill to limit CFTC authority to
regulate derivatives, which passed with no discussion on this issue.84
History has proven Born was correct, and it was the deregulatory
mindset of Rubin, Summers, and Greenspan that led to a financial crisis.
Thus, profit was privatized and risk was socialized.
3. The Continuing Pattern of Deregulation into the 2000s
In 2000, Edward Gramlich, a former Federal Reserve Board mem-
ber, suggested to Chairman Greenspan that the Fed examine consumer
finance lenders that were units of federally regulated bank holding com-
panies. Greenspan opposed this action because it might undermine the
availability of subprime lending.85 This deregulatory attitude persisted
during the 2000s. According to Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning
economist, at a 2003 press conference, "[r]epresentatives of four of the
five government agencies responsible for financial supervision used tree
shears to attack a stack of paper representing bank regulations. The fifth
representative, James Gilleran of the Office of Thrift Supervision, wield-
80. Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2008, at Al.
81. In the financial industry, persons who do quantitative analysis are frequently called
"quants." See Scorr PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES
CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 3 (2010).
82. For a discussion of CDSs, see infra text accompanying notes 146-55.
83. Brady Dennis & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Crack in the System, WASH. POST, Dec. 30,
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/29/AR2008122902670.html.
84. See Goodman, supra note 80.
85. Greg Ip, Did Greenspan Add to Subprime Woes?, WALL ST. J., Jun. 9,2007, at BI.
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ed a chainsaw."86 This interesting visual was emblematic of the attitude
of the Fed and the Bush Administration toward regulation.
In 2001, the OCC, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision issued a joint release that authorized the use of "credit
ratings from the rating agencies to measure relative exposure to credit
risk and determine the associated risk-based capital requirement."8  For
example, if a security were rated AAA, a factor of 20% would be applied
to the asset securitization in determining the amount of capital the bank
would need to hold. In effect, the determination of risk assessment was
transferred from the governmental regulators to the credit-rating agen-
cies, which were beholden to the financial industry. As a result, the fi-
nancial firms had securities that were rated AAA, against which they
held minimal capital but which turned out to be junk.8
Building upon this deregulatory mindset, the SEC, in 2004, modi-
fied the net capital rules for brokers to enable five major firms to nearly
double their leverage.89 According to Lee Pickard, a former SEC regula-
tor who participated in formulating the old rule:
The SEC's basic net capital rule, one of the prominent successes in
federal financial regulatory oversight, had an excellent track record in
preserving the securities markets' financial integrity and protecting
customer assets. There have been very few liquidations of broker-
dealers and virtually no customer or interdealer losses due to broker-
dealer insolvency during the past 33 years.
Under an alternative approach adopted by the SEC in 2004, bro-
ker-dealers with, in practice, at least $5 billion of capital (such as
Bear Steams) were permitted to avoid the haircuts on securities posi-
tions and the limitations on indebtedness contained in the basic net
capital rule. Instead, the alternative net capital program relies heavily
86. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Blindly into the Bubble, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2007, at A37.
87. Risk-based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance:
Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitiza-
tions, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,625 (Nov. 29, 2001) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208,
225, 325, and 567).
88. One study found that the value of AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities (as measured by
the corresponding credit-default-swaps prices) had fallen by 70% between January 2007 and De-
cember 2008. See Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Credit Ratings Failures: Causes and Policy Op-
tions I (Columbia Univ. Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in Am., Working Paper, 2009),
available at
http://www.italianacademy.columbia.edulpublications/working papers/20082009/pagano-volpin s
eminar_ IA.pdf. According to another report, by August 2008, Moody's had downgraded 90% of all
asset-backed CDO investments issued in 2006 and 2007, and Standard & Poor's had downgraded
84% of the CDO tranches it rated. See Cormick Grimshaw, Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings
Let Loose Subprime Scourge, MARKET PIPELINE (Sept. 25, 2008, 7:58 PM),
http://marketpipeline.blogspot.com/2008/09/bringing-down-wall-street-as-ratings 25.html. Moreo-
ver, they had downgraded 85% and 76%, respectively, of the AAA securities they had rated. Id.
89. See Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of Broker-Dealers, N.Y.
SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, at Bus. 1; see also Lee A. Pickard, Op-Ed., SEC's Old Capital Approach Was
Tried-and True, AM. BANKER, Aug. 8, 2008, at Viewpoints 10.
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on a risk management control system, mathematical models to price
positions, value-at-risk models, and close SEC oversight.90
The SEC's staff was supposed to monitor the risk assessment activities
of the brokers but never adequately supervised the program.9 1
When a firm's leverage ratio is in the mid-thirties, a 3% drop in the
value of assets could impair its capital.92 The relationship between the
leverage ratio and drop in the value of the assets necessary to wipe out a
bank's capital is illustrated by Figure 3 below:
Figure 3. Decline in Assets that Will Wipe Out a Bank's Capital at
Different Leverage Levels
100
80
j 60
'U
a)
40
20
1 to l 2 to l 5 to l 10 to l 20 to l 30 to l40 to l 5o to l
Leverage
Source: Ezra Klein, Explaining Financial Regulation: Leverage and Capital Requirements,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2010/04/explainingfinancial regulatio.html.
Once again, federal regulators were relying upon the regulated to moni-
tor themselves, with disastrous consequences, as Bear Steams and Leh-
man Brothers demonstrated. Both firms had leverage ratios of over thir-
ty-to-one at the time of their collapse.
Whereas federal regulators were oblivious to the problem of sub-
prime lending, state regulators were more vigilant. In 1999, North Caro-
90. Pickard, supra note 89.
91. See FIN. CRISIs INQUIRY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 153-54 (2011).
92. See Ezra Klein, Explaining Financial Regulation: Leverage and Capital Requirements,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2010/04/explainingfinancial regulatio.html.
522 [Vol. 90:2
THE BIG BANKS AND "TOO BIG TO FAIL"
lina passed a predatory lending law9 3 and, in 2002, Georgia did the
same. 94 The OCC, in its ruling preempting Georgia law, summarized the
Georgia law as follows:
"High-cost home loans" were subject to the restrictions on "home
loans" [prohibitions on the financing of credit insurance, debt cancel-
lation or suspension coverage, and limitations on late fees and payoff
statement fees] and "covered home loans," [restrictions on the num-
ber of times a loan could be refinanced and the circumstances in
which a refinancing could occur] as well as numerous disclosure re-
quirements and restrictions on the terms of credit and loan-related
fees. Creditors were required to disclose to borrowers that the loan is
high-cost, and borrowers were required to be provided with certain
loan counseling before the creditor could make the loan. In addition,
the [Georgia Fair Lending Act] prohibited certain pre-payment penal-
ties; balloon payments; negative amortization; increases in interest
rates after default; advance payments from loan proceeds; fees to
modify, renew, extend, amend, or defer a payment; and accelerating
payments at the creditor's or servicer's sole discretion. 95
The practices that the states sought to outlaw, but that the OCC permit-
ted, were the ones that led to the toxic mortgages, which in turn led to the
real estate bubble bursting.
In preempting the state regulation, the OCC first exempted the na-
tional banks from Georgia's lending restrictions; previously, the Office
of Thrift Supervision had concluded that federal law preempted both the
Georgia law and a New Jersey statute. Later, in 2003, the OCC also
preempted the New Jersey law and, the following year, generally ex-
empted national banks from any state mortgage regulations.97
The attempted state regulation would have reined in some of the
predatory lending practices that led to the financial meltdown. The feder-
al regulators not only shut down state regulatory enforcement but also
failed to exercise the supervisory power they possessed.98 For example,
consider the following material-loss assessment with respect to Flagship
National Bank:
OCC performed timely examinations of Flagship in accordance with
examination guidelines but did not report or take actions to address
the bank's [commercial real estate] concentrations or its inadequate
credit risk management, liberal underwriting, and poor credit admin-
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2 (2012).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6 (2012).
95. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264,46,267 (Aug. 5, 2003).
96. News Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Says New Jersey Law Does Not Apply
to Federal Thrifts (July 23, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/ files/77322.html.
97. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904,
1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
98. See Eric Dash, Pathology of a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at Bl.
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istration until the 2008 examination. These conditions had existed be-
fore-from 2005 through 2007-but OCC did not address them dur-
ing the earlier examinations.99
Not everybody in the 2000s was oblivious to the impact of deregu-
lation and the complexity of our banking system. Alan Greenspan was
honored at an annual gathering of high-powered economists in Septem-
ber 2005 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Raghuram Rajan, a graduate busi-
ness school professor at the University of Chicago, delivered a working
paper entitled Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? He
was concerned about the managerial incentives to take undue risk and
stated that "the kinds of risks that can most easily be concealed, given the
requirement of periodic reporting, are risks that generate severe adverse
consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous com-
pensation the rest of the time."'00 Those few words describe the moral
hazard among banking executives that led to the economic meltdown we
experienced. He identified credit default swaps as instruments with high
profitability but little apparent risk. This was the AIG problem. He also
identified the risk posed by financial institutions that retain some of the
toxic securities they produced: when the securities started to fail, banks
would not deal with each other. Again, he was prescient: consider the
discussion of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in Part III.1o1
What was the reaction to his paper? He was scorned. 0 2 But as the
following Parts demonstrate, deregulation and financial innovation
brought us to the edge of economic collapse.
III. THE FINANCIAL CRISIs: CAUSES AND AFTERMATH
I have chronicled the causes of the financial crisis in an earlier arti-
cle.10 3 Basically, worldwide assets available for investment doubled be-
tween 2001 and 2006.104 However, interest rates were historically low,
reflecting Chairman Greenspan's desire to keep the economy growing.
The Bush tax cuts were supposed to spur the economy, but growth, par-
ticularly as measured by jobs, was anemic. Because of the Fed's policies,
U.S. bonds were paying only 1% to 4 %, depending upon the issuance
date and maturity. 0 5 The low interest rates motivated investors to find
99. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: MATERIAL LOSS
REvIEW OF FLAGSHIP NATIONAL BANK 5 (2011).
100. Raghuram Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? 3 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11728, 2005).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
102. Justin Lahart, Mr. Rajan Was Unpopular (But Prescient) at Greenspan Party, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 2, 2009, at A7.
103. See Murdock, supra note 9, at 1244.
104. See INT'L FIN. SERV. LONDON, FUND MANAGEMENT REPORT 7 (2008).
105. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 728
tbl.1 158 (2009).
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other investments that were supposedly safe but carried a higher return
than government bonds.
Prior to 2000, real estate had been a relatively safe investment. Re-
lying on the old data, rating agencies began to issue AAA ratings to a
variety of mortgage-backed securities. Unfortunately, the mortgage mar-
ket of 2003-2007 bore little relation to the pre-2000 market. The number
of subprime loans jumped from 456,631 in 2000 to 2,284,420 in 2005.1o6
Similarly, Alt-A loans increased from 78,183 in 2000 to 1,447,782 in
2005.107 Subprime loans were among the financial innovations that
Chairman Greenspan extolled. Other products, such as pick-a-pay loans,
came into the market. A pick-a-pay loan permitted a borrower to choose
the amount of the mortgage payment, which could be even less than the
accruing interest, thereby creating a negative amortization situation.
ARMs supplanted the traditional thirty-year fixed-payment mortgage.
When they reset to a higher interest rate, the buyer often could not make
the higher monthly payment. And "no doc," or liars' loans, became prev-
alent. Mortgage lenders stopped verifying the borrower's financial in-
formation. As one lender stated: "Whatever they wanted to state for their
income. The bank accepted that at face value and made the loan based on
that income."
0 8
Loans were churned out, not underwritten. The Financial Crisis In-
quiry Commission reported: "Several of these factories were originating,
packaging, securitizing and selling at the rate of $1 billion a day. The
quality control process failed at a variety of stages during the manufac-
turing, distribution and on-going servicing."109 Profits for mortgage lend-
ers and investment bankers increased dramatically, as did CEO compen-
sation, sales and finder commissions, and bonuses. Rating agencies sold
their AAA ratings to the investment bankers, who compensated the rat-
ing agencies handsomely for their ratings. Volume, not quality, was the
touchstone. Everybody was making money hand over fist. Financial pro-
fessionals apparently expected the joyride to go on forever.
But then came the mortgage defaults. Although some commentators
have blamed the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
for the crisis, the private-label securities produced by Wall Street de-
faulted at twice the rate as those of Fannie Mae. See Figure 4 below for
106. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R, CHARACTERISTICS AND
PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 24 (2009). Subprime loans are those made to a borrower
with a low credit score at an interest rate above that generally provided to borrowers using traditional
mortgages. Alt-A loans are those made without traditional documentation.
107. Id.
108. See 60 Minutes: House of Cards; The Mortgage Mess (CBS television broadcast January
27, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videolwatch/?id=3756665n.
109. See Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Conm'n, II Ith Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of
Keith Johnson, Former Pres., Clayton Holdings, Inc. & Wash. Mut.'s Long Beach Mortg.)
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the comparative data for 2005 through 2007.0 In the ensuing three
years, the default rates nearly tripled:"'
Figure 4. Cumulative Default Rates for Fannie Mae Alt-A and Private
Label Alt-A for 2005, 2006, and 2007 Cohorts
' ' 4 4 . 0 -t 6' 11 4 16 4 4 4 41 0' ih i
Source: FANNIE MAE, 2008 CREDIT SUPPLEMENT 12 (2009).
As the default rates increased, down came the price of mortgage-backed
securities and, as a consequence, down came Bear Steams in March
2008.112 The bailout of Bear Stearns seemed to settle the situation tempo-
rarily, but then came Lehman Brothers.1 3 Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson decided not to rescue Lehman Brothers; it went bankrupt, and
the Primary Reserve Fund "broke the buck." 1 4 A worldwide economic
meltdown was in the offing.115
110. FANNIE MAE, 2008 CREDIT SUPPLEMENT 12 (2009).
111. FANNIE MAE, 2011 FIRST QUARTER CREDIT SUPPLEMENT 13 (2011).
112. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS passim (2009) (chronicling in great detail the
ten days in March that led to the collapse of Bear Steams).
1 13. Big Banks Fail, Signaling More Economic Troubles Ahead, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 16,
2008), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/us/july-dec08/banks 9-16.pdf.
114. Diana B. Henriques, Buck Broken, but Timing May Affect Reductions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2008, at B4. "Breaking the buck" means that the value of a share in the mutual fund fell below
one dollar. Money is invested or borrowed in a money-market system on a short-term basis, some-
times overnight. The return from a money market investment is not as much as from a long-term
investment; consequently, investors do not expect to lose any money. Money-market funds were
regarded as totally safe. Companies park their money in them overnight and rely upon them as a
source of credit when they need short-term funds. All companies oscillate between having cash on
hand and needing to borrow cash on a particular day. Thus, when the Lehman Brothers debt was
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Congress responded in October 2008 with a $700 billion bailout,"l6
and the Fed made trillions of dollars of credit available to the banks.117
The government bailed out the banks but essentially asked for nothing in
return. The banks later rewarded the federal largess by aggressively re-
sisting the Dodd-Frank reform legislation." 8 The bailout avoided the
specter of another Great Depression, but the economy was in shambles.
The new Obama Administration responded in February 2009 with an
inadequate stimulus package," 9 which turned out to be a palliative rather
than a cure.120
President Obama also sought to provide some relief for beleaguered
homeowners to help them avoid foreclosure.121 This program turned out
to be a failure because banks had no incentive to accept a modest fee for
modifying mortgages when such modification would impact their assets
and their earnings. 2 2 At the time, probably most banks were "legally"
insolvent-assets were less than liabilities-but we will never know for
certain because an accounting change saved them from revaluing their
assets to the then current market value.123 The Fed saved the banks from
being "equitably" insolvent-not being able to pay their debts as they
written down, first to $0.80 on the dollar and then to zero, it created a panic as investors rushed to
get their money out of money-market funds.
115. Treasury Secretary Paulson responded to the crisis by calling congressional leaders to-
gether and informing them that "[u]nless you act, the financial system of this country and the world
will melt down in a matter of days." Frontline: Inside the Meltdown (PBS television broadcast Feb.
17, 2009).
116. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 115, 122
Stat. 3765, 3780.
117. See Pittman & Ivry, supra note 7.
118. Times Topics: Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit crisis/financial regulatory_r
efonn/index.html (last updated Sept. 20,2011).
119. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
The original stimulus amount was $787 billion. See Breakdown of Funding by Category: Total
Funds Allocated, RECOVERY.GOV,
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/fundingoverview/Pages/fundingbreakdown.aspx (last visited
Jan. 5, 2013).
120. See Shaila Dewan, Zero Job Growth Latest Bleak Sign for U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2011, at Al.
121. See Phyllis Caldwell, Making Home Affordable Campaign to Help America's Homeown-
ers, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 1, 2009, 5:48 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/01/making-home-affordable-campaign-help-america-s-
homeowners; see also Tami Luhby, Obama Expands Mortgage Modification Effort, CNNMONEY
(Mar. 26, 2010, 3:44 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/26/news/economy/Obama-mortgage relief!.
122. See Neil M. Barofsky, Op-Ed., Where the Bailout Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2011, at A27 (discussing the program's failure and noting that Barofsky was the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) Inspector General until March 2011); see also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 64, 67 (2011) (showing TARP's limited success, with less than 20% of estimated home-
owners to be affected obtaining relief).
123. See DETERMINING FAIR VALUE WHEN THE VOLUME AND LEVEL OF ACTIVITY FOR THE
ASSET OR LIABILITY HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED AND IDENTIFYING TRANSACTIONS THAT
ARE NOT ORDERLY, Staff Position No. FAS 157-4 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009) (affording
financial institutions significant leeway in "determining fair value when the volume and level of
activity for the asset or liability have significantly decreased").
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came due-by creating profits for banks by lending them funds, in some
cases at almost a zero interest rate.12 4
As the foreclosures exploded, 125 it became apparent that the mort-
gage servicers-many of which were subsidiaries of the big banks-had
inadequate records and often had no idea where the underlying notes
resided. 126 So, in many instances, they falsified court documents when
foreclosures were initiated. Litigation ensued. 127
In 2008-2010, the much-maligned Democrat-controlled U.S. House
of Representatives (which lost control to the Republicans in 2010 due, in
part, to voter anger over Wall Street being bailed out but nothing being
done for Main Street) actually passed legislation that might have
stemmed the decline of the housing market. The Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009128 would have, in effect, enabled homeowners
to file bankruptcy but retain their homes with a modified mortgage re-
flecting the current value of the property. However, the Democrat-
controlled U.S. Senate, which unfortunately needed sixty votes to pass
legislation because of Republican filibusters, failed to pass the legisla-
tion.
By giving homeowners the option to file bankruptcy and keep their
homes with a modified mortgage, lenders would have had an incentive to
negotiate private modifications outside bankruptcy. This could have sub-
stantially reduced the rate of foreclosures. However, this approach was
opposed by many as involving moral hazard, because it could reward
those who had borrowed more than they could repay in order to buy a
home that was beyond their means.
On the other hand, when a lender forecloses, the most the lender
will realize is the current market value of the foreclosed property, and
oftentimes substantially less. The glut of foreclosures has left neighbor-
hoods with empty homes, encouraged vandalism, and triggered further
drops in property values. 129 In addition, foreclosures have increased the
124. Jesse Eisinger, How the U.S. Shelters and Subsidizes the Banking Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2011, at B7 ("When the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates to help buoy the economy
during a slowdown, banks are the first beneficiaries. As the Fed lowers short-term rates, banks
borrow cheaply and lend out for a lot more, making any new lending highly profitable . .. .").
125. Barofsky, supra note 122 (noting the estimates that foreclosures will number between
eight million and thirteen million filings before the crisis runs its course).
126. See John Carney, A Primer on The Foreclosure Crisis, CNBC.COM (Oct. 11, 2010, 2:48
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39617381/APrimerOnTheForeclosureCrisis.
127. See Margaret Cronin Fisk & Kathleen M. Howley, The Foreclosure Mess Could Last For
Years, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 6, 2010, 11:00 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/I10 42/b4199043406256.htm.
128. H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (2009). A different version of the Helping Families Save Their
Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632, was eventually passed that May.
129. Christine Vidmar, Seven Ways Foreclosures Impact Communities, NEIGHBORWORKS
AMERICA (Aug. 2008),
http://www.nw.org/network/neighborworksprogs/foreclosuresolutions/reports/documents/7Foreclosu
relmpacts.pdf.
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supply of homes in the market at a time when there are fewer buyers
because of the stagnant economy. Thus, foreclosures exacerbate the
downward pressure on housing prices, which not only depresses the
housing market but also impedes economic recovery.130
Although the Obama Administration has come up with another
mortgage modification plan, 31 and the recent settlement between the
state attorneys general and the big banks provides some relief to borrow-
ers,132 these small steps are a long way from resolving the foreclosure
problem.
Basically, this situation is what innovation has wrought. The impact
of innovation will be further explored in Part IV.
IV. FINANCIAL INNOVATION
A. Has Financial Innovation Created Value?
Alan Greenspan, while Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, was
a strong advocate for financial innovation:
Alan Greenspan has presented a free market defence of financial in-
novations based on Joseph A. Schumpeter's theory that innovations
initiate a dynamic process of "creative destruction" in a capitalistic
system....
As Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Greenspan's interpreta-
tion of the Schumpeterian role of financial innovations in the "New
Economy" has had important consequences. It had an influence on
the Fed's passive response to the emergence of a speculative bubble
in the financial markets, on the one hand, and its proactive response
to the collapse of a large hedge fund which suffered huge losses on
derivative contracts, on the other. It was reflected in Greenspan's tes-
timonies that influenced the U.S. Congress to exempt over-the-
counter financial derivatives from government regulation and to re-
130. See Robert J. Barro, Op-Ed., How to Really Save the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2011, at SR8.
131. See Don Lee, Obama Pushes Housing Plan in Weekly Address, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/04/news/la-pn-obama-weekly-address-20120204 (explaining
President Obama's new proposal to allow homeowners to refinance mortgages at lower interest
rates, even if they owe more than the house is worth); see also Kenneth R. Harney, Some Refinanc-
ing Ideas Have an Inside Track, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 2012, at E04 (describing the various portions
of President Obama's mortgage proposal and discussing the likelihood of passage for each proposal).
132. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, $26 Billion Deal Is Said to be Set for Home-
owners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at Al (explaining the settlement agreed to by government offi-
cials and five large banks); see also NAT'L MORTG. SETTLEMENT,
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (containing specific details
about the mortgage settlement, along with resources for borrowers). For a graphic depicting how the
settlement money will be used, see Help for Some Homeowners, N.Y. TliMtES, Feb. 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/02/09/business/help-for-some-homeowners.html
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peal the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking. 133
But derivatives were not the only innovation favored by Chairman
Greenspan. He was also a strong advocate of the "benefits" of subprime
lending. In 2005, when subprime lending was gearing up to sink the
economy, he stated:
Innovation has brought about a multitude of new products, such as
subprime loans and niche credit programs for immigrants. ... With
these advances in technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-
scoring models and other techniques for efficiently extending credit
to a broader spectrum of consumers... . Where once more-marginal
applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now
able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants
and to price that risk appropriately. These improvements have led to
rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending[,] ... fostering construc-
tive innovation that is both responsive to market demand and benefi-
cial to consumers.134
With a bias such as this, it is no wonder that Greenspan took no steps to
regulate the banking industry's predatory subprime loans.
But isn't innovation good? Americans generally hold innovation in
high regard. However, there are substantial differences between financial
innovation and technological innovation. Technological innovation often
starts in the lab, garage, or basement. It is tested, challenged, and scaled
up. It is generally based upon scientific principles that have been devel-
oped, tested, and replicated over time. Its development is frequently
funded by outside sources that provide another level of accountability.
This is not to say that technological innovation has not had its dark
side. Decades ago, the dangers of the DDT pesticide were brought to the
public by Rachel Carlson's Silent Spring.13 5 Today, the whole world is
aware of the risks of nuclear power from the meltdown in Japan. 1 But,
on balance, although technical innovation has produced great private
profit, it also has produced extraordinary social benefits. Health care
advances have saved millions of lives,137 agricultural developments have
enabled us to grow 200 bushels of corn per acre where formerly we
133. Charles G. Leathers & J. Patrick Raines, The Schumpeterian Role of Financial Innova-
tions in the New Economy's Business Cycle, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 667, 667-68 (2004) (citation
omitted).
134. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve System's
Fourth Annual Community Affairs Research Conference (Apr. 8, 2005) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2005/20050408/default.htm.
135. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING passim (1962) (bringing awareness to the
public and helping to facilitate the ban of the pesticide DDT in 1972).
136. See generally Floyd Norris, 2 Meltdowns with Much in Common, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2011, at BI (discussing the recent nuclear meltdown in Japan).
137. See Dan Childs & Susan Kansagra, 10 Health Advances that Changed the World, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/TenWays/storyid=3605442.
530 [Vol. 90:2
THE BIG BANKS AND "TOO BIG TO FAIL"
could only grow twenty,'38 and the computer and the Internet have creat-
ed whole new industries and millions of jobs.139
To put financial innovation on the same continuum as technological
innovation is disingenuous. Financial innovation was never initiated in
the garage but by overpaid quants working for billion-dollar corpora-
tions. 140 More importantly, it has not had the testing and required replica-
tion necessary before technological innovation is opened to the market.
One of the world's most distinguished quants, Paul Wilmott, in discuss-
ing models based upon correlation and volatility, stated:
With models, you want to see where things go wrong ... .You want
to see the dirt. But HJM [the model] is actually just a big rug for
[mistakes] to be swept under... . In the end, we should all like mod-
els that wear their faults on their sleeves.
They built these things [collateralized debt obligations] on false as-
sumptions without testing them, and stuffed them full of trillions of
dollars. How could anyone have thought that was a good idea?
We need to get back to testing models rather than revering them ....
That's hard work, but this idea that there are these great principles
governing finance and that correlations can just be plucked out of the
air is totally false.141
There is no question that financial innovation has created incredible
private wealth. 142 However, any benefits are difficult to quantify. Sup-
posedly, financial innovations can match risk and return, or the timing of
cash flows. For example, the creation of structured financial products
could enable an insurance company or pension fund to better match its
liabilities-the maturities of payment obligations-with its assets by
fine-tuning the maturities and target returns of its assets.
But, insurance companies and pension funds have functioned ade-
quately with less "sophisticated"--read complicated and possibly in-
comprehensible-products in the past. Because of the complexity of
138. See MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNwoRE's DILEMMA 36-37 (2006).
139. See Michael J. Mandel, Jobs: The Lull Will Linger, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 24, 2004),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_43/b3905044_mzO 1 .htm.
140. See Matthew Philips, Revenge of the Nerd, DAILY BEAST (May 28, 2009, 8:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/05/28/revenge-of-the-nerd.html; see also
PATTERSON, supra note 81, at 3.
141. Philips, supra note 140 (second alteration in original).
142. Times Topics: Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/executive_pay/index.html (last updat-
ed Oct. 10, 2012).
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these products, 14 3 they became the province of our huge, well-capitalized
and diversified big banks, thus giving them another competitive ad-
vantage over the smaller and mid-sized banks.144 In addition, the finan-
cial incentives to selling these products led the big banks to continue to
push the envelope in terms of risk.
Let us consider financial innovation in more depth. Banks do not
create value. They are intermediaries who direct funds from investors
into productive investments. But, instead of fulfilling this function, they
created financial products and, in the process, consumed large amounts
of capital. In 1978, banks and related institutions "borrowed $13 in the
credit markets for every $100 borrowed by the real economy; by 2007,
that had grown to $51 ."45 This measures only balance sheet assets; it
does not take into account derivatives, which have grown exponentially
from the 1990s to today.146 The capital that flowed into structured finan-
cial products was capital that was not available for more productive in-
vestment.
Consider financial products. Start with 1,000 homes. Create 1,000
mortgages. Put 100 of the mortgages into an asset-backed security. Re-
peat ten times. We now have ten pools of mortgages and each pool can
be divided into units and sold to numerous investors. We have now cre-
ated ten pristine mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), each unit of which
would have the same undivided interest in each mortgage. Alternatively,
we could divide each mortgage pool into three tranches: senior, interme-
diate, and junior, creating what are known as collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs). The senior tranche would be paid before the holders of the
intermediate and junior tranches and, subject to the prior right of the sen-
ior tranche holders, the holders of the intermediate tranche would be paid
before the holders of the junior tranche. Assume, because of their relative
riskiness, securities in the senior tranche would earn 4.5%; in the inter-
mediate tranche, 6%; and the junior tranche, 7.5%. Assuming all three
tranches were entitled to one-third of the income from the mortgages and
one-third of the principal upon repayment, subject to the above prioriti-
zation, one might intuitively think that the senior tranche would be rated
AAA because of its preferred claim to income and assets, the intermedi-
ate tranche rated A, and the junior tranche rated B.
The above description reflected a cylinder analogy, with three slices
or segments, each of which is equal to the others in size. But in the real
143. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
144. See infra notes 207-09 accompanying text.
145. JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 15, at 59-60; see also FED. RESERVE, CREDIT MARKET
DEBT OUTSTANDING 64 tbl.LI (2012) (listing current data on credit market debt outstanding).
146. The volume of OTC derivative contracts was $80 trillion in 1999. The volume has grown
to $600 trillion in ten years. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REvIEw A141 tbl.19
(2012), http://www.bis.org/statistics/oteder/dtl920a.pdf.
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world, this analogy fails because not all tranches have equal value. A
more accurate analogy would be that of an inverted cone.
Moreover, there would be many more tranches than three. One se-
curity I examined had fifteen tranches. Seven of the tranches had AAA
credit ratings, but these seven tranches composed 83% of the value of the
offering. The lowest three tranches were rated BBB+/BBB- but com-
prised only 3% of the offering. These lower three trenches were the
"foundation" upon which the AAA-rated securities above rested.14 7
Figure 5. Illustrative Tranching of Collateralized Debt Obligation
AAA
(seven tranches)
(83%)
AA/A-
(five tranches)
(14%)
BBB+/BBB-
(three tranches)
(3%)
Source: Ameriquest Mortg. Sec. Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5), at S-1, S-5
(Dec. 15, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347199/000089109205002534/e23035_424b5.txt.
But we are not yet done. In the simple illustration of three tranches,
we could take the BBB-rated tranches from three different pools, put
them in a new container (sometimes called a CDO-squared), and re-
tranche. Now, even though all the securities are rated BBB, the new sen-
ior tranche could be rated AAA and even carry a higher interest rate than
the AAA-rated security in the predecessor MBS because of the greater
interest entitlement of the new CDO (e.g., its underlying securities might
pay 7.5% interest).
147. See, e.g., Ameriquest Mortg. Sec. Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5), at S-1, S-5
(Dec. 15, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347199/000089109205002534/e23035_424b5.txt. In this
$1,793,610,000 offering of mortgage-backed securities, five tranches totaling $1,483,410,000 were
rated AAA, and another seven tranches totaling $251,650,000 were rated A- or better. The last three
tranches, rated BBB+ to BBB-, totaled only $58,550,000. So, although there were twelve tranches
below the AAA tranches, they totaled only 17% of the offering. Id.
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But, yet, there is more. We could now write credit default insurance
against the failure of the CDOs to pay out: thus the creation of CDSs and
synthetic CDOs. We could create another pool of investor funds, which
would guarantee the payments of the CDO in exchange for a premium.
One way to bet against the housing market would be to buy protec-
tion in the form of CDSs. This is essentially what occurred in the Abacus
transaction in which the SEC sued Goldman Sachs for creating a synthet-
ic CDO without disclosing that the CDO was created at the insistence of
hedge fund manager John Paulson, who wanted to bet against the hous-
ing market. 14 8 Thus, it was in his interest to have the CDO guarantee
securities that were likely to default. Goldman Sachs permitted Paulson
to participate in the selection of securities without disclosing his adverse
interest to investors. Although Goldman earned commissions and fees up
front, it also "earned," or rather paid, a $550 million settlement. 149
Where is the value in the foregoing chain? One rationale is that it is
possible to manufacture securities with varying rates of return commen-
surate with different levels of risk. But at what cost? These banking in-
novations have brought the world economy, not just that of the United
States, to the brink of collapse. What has also been demonstrated by the
financial meltdown is that financial managers greatly overestimated their
ability to measure and control risk.
Recently, JPMorgan Chase, which came through the 2008 financial
meltdown relatively unscathed and thus was lauded for its risk manage-
ment, unexpectedly announced that its chief investment office had lost
$2 billion in trading, then reported a $4.4 billion loss, and finally revised
its own estimate to almost $6 billion, with speculation that it could go as
high as $9 billion. 50Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan
Chase, first dismissed the problem as a "tempest in a teapot" but, as the
scope of the loss became public, he acknowledged that it was an "egre-
gious mistake."15' However, hewing to his deregulatory mindset, he ar-
148. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
149. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
123.htm.
150. See Stephen Gandel, JPMorgan's Trading Debacle: Why $2 Billion Is Just the Start,
CNNMONEY (May 13, 2012), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/ll/jpmorgan-2-billion-just-
start/; Dawn Kopecki and Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan's $4.4 Billion CIO Loss Drives Profit Down
9%, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-13/jpmorgan-s-4-4-
billion-cio-loss-drives-profit-down-9-percent.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig,
JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 28, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion/.
151. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, JPMorgan Discloses $2 Billion in Trading
Losses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 10, 2012, 10:11 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/1 0/jpmorgan-discloses-significant-losses-in-trading-
group/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit th 20120511. One of the persons who was largely responsi-
ble for the trading losses was Bruno Iksil, who was known as the "London whale," and the debacle is
sometimes referred to as the London whale trading loss. See id. The scope of this egregious mistake
is now detailed in a 307-page study by a congressional committee. U.S. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND
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gued that "[j]ust because we're stupid doesn't mean everybody else
was.. .. There were huge moves in the marketplace but we made these
positions more complex and they were badly monitored." 52
The problem appears to have occurred when J.P. Morgan re-hedged
the original hedge, and it was this re-hedging that was acknowledged to
be "flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, poorly executed, and poorly
managed."' 5 3 The transactions now look more like trading than hedging
because the Senate investigation revealed that J.P. Morgan had "failed to
identify the assets or portfolios being hedged, test the size and effective-
ness of the alleged hedging activity, or show how the [synthetic credit
portfolio] lowered rather than increased bank risk."' 54 J.P. Morgan in-
vested not just in CDSs but also in credit indices and credit index tranch-
es.' 55 A credit index is a more complicated form of credit derivative, in
which the index references a basket of selected credit instruments, typi-
cally credit default swaps or similar credit instruments.5 6
This is another example of financial innovation run amok. Mr.
Dimon acknowledged the complexity of the transactions and the inability
of J.P. Morgan to effectively assess and monitor risk. Apparently, partic-
ular risks were not hedged, but rather the bank engaged in what is some-
times euphemistically referred to as portfolio hedging. The line between
hedging, market-making, and proprietary trading is indeed a thin one in
the operations of these big banks. 5 7
There continue to be financial incentives in the big banks to take
large risks. Ina Drew, who oversaw the unit that experienced the trading
losses, earned over $31.4 million the past two years, and is eligible for
nearly $14.7 million of deferred equity awards.'5 8 Unlike what occurred
in 2008-2009, some of this compensation may be clawed back.159
SEC. & GOv'T AFFAIRS, PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE
TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES passim (2013) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chase-
whale-trades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses.
152. See Nelson D. Schwartz, A Shock from JPMorgan Is New Fodder for Reformers, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 10, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/a-shock-
from-jpmorgan-is-new-fodder-for-reformers/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit th20120511.
153. See Matt Levine, Whale Sushi on the Menu at JP. Morgan Executive Lunchroom for Next
Few Months, DEALBREAKER.COM (May 12, 2012, 6:21 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2012/05/whale-
sushi-on-the-menu-at-jpmorgan-executive-lunchroom-for-next-few-months/.
154. SENATE REPORT, supra note 151, at 15.
155. Id. at 29-34.
156. Id.
157. See Ben Protess, After Loss, JPMorgan Regulators in Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(June 5, 2012 8:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/jpmorgan-regulators-in-spotlight-
after-firms-huge-loss/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=editth_20120606 ("J.P. Morgan officials say the
chief investment office initially hedged the bank's broad exposure to the markets, until the positions
morphed into a proprietary bet.").
158. See Mia Lamar, JP Morgan's Drew Retires; Zames to Take CIO Post, WALL ST. J. (May
14, 2012, 1:52 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304192704577403911410998528.html; Matt
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Although the benefits from financial innovation are tenuous-
except for the compensation packages they generated-the social costs
were disastrous. The end result of these innovations was the worst finan-
cial crisis since the Great Depression. Growth in gross domestic product
(GDP) dropped to a negative 9%160 and unemployment approached
10%.161 Underemployment was even higher.162
B. Economic and Political Costs ofFinancial Innovation
We are now almost four years past the September-October 2008
meltdown, and unemployment has finally dropped to about 8%.163 Job
losses, which approximated 780,000 in January 2009, have been reversed
and the private sector has added jobs for thirty-six consecutive months,
but only at a modest level,' as reflected in Figure 6 below:
Scuffharn & David Henry, JPMorgan CIO Retires, Obama Says Proves Reform Case, REUTERS,
(May 14, 2012, 7:56 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/14/us-jpmorgan-
departures-idUSBRE84COEP20120514.
159. See Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan's Drew Forfeits 2 Years' Pay as Managers Ousted,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 13, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-
13/dimon-says-ina-drew-offered-to-return-2-years-of-compensation.
160. Jared Bernstein, The Impact of the Recovery Act, in a Few Easy Charts, ON THE ECON.
BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011, 5:23.PM), http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/the-recovery-act-worked-in-a-few-
easy-charts/.
161. Id.
162. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES 46, 51
(2011).
163. Jared Bernstein, Jobs Day . .. First Impressions (with Reflections on the Fiscal Clif), ON
THE ECON. BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:35 PM), http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/jobs-day-first-impressions-
with-reflections-on-the-fiscal-cliff/.
164. See Megan M. Barker & Adam A. Hadi, Payroll Employment in 2009: Job Losses
Continue, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2010, at 23, 23; Rich Exner, Private-sector Jobs Rise, Gov-
ernment Jobs Shrink over Last 3 Years: Sunday's Numbers, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 17, 2013, 9:03
AM), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentrallindex.ssf/2013/03/private-sector jobsrisegover.html.
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Figure 6. Private and Government Monthly Job Changes, 2007-2013
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Note: Data is based on total private and government revised, seasonally adjusted monthly em-
ployment changes. January and February 2013 statistics are based on preliminary data.
Source: News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Employment Situa-
tion-February 2013 (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf; Govern-
ment: All Employees; Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.compaes.txt (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Total Private: All
Employees; Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.compaes.txt (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
The depth of the downturn and the tepidness of the recovery are far
worse than any other downturn since the Great Depression.165
165. See Bill McBride, September Employment Report: 114,000 Jobs, 7.8% Unemployment
Rate, CALCULATED RISK BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:30 AM),
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2012/1 0/september-employment-report-I 14000-jobs.html; see
also Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI (dis-
cussing a report issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce).
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Figure 7. Percentage Job Losses in Post-WWII Recessions
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Source: Bill McBride, Percent Job Losses: Great Recession and Great Depression,
CALCULATED RISK BLOG (July 7, 2012, 10:04 PM),
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2012/07/percent-job-losses-great-recession-and.html.
The costs associated with bailing out the big banks have been not
just economic but also political. Republicans have touted their 2010 vic-
tory as vindicating their policies of cutting spending and rejecting tax
increases. 166 However, an alternative reading of the 2010 election may be
that it reflected anger toward a political system that bailed out bankers
but not homeowners,167 and held no one in the banking system accounta-
ble. 16 8 Unlike the savings and loan crisis, no senior executive has gone to
jail, and compensation remains at obscene levels in the banking indus-
try.169
On the other hand, the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, the stimulus
programs following the 2008 meltdown, and decreased tax revenues
caused by the severe recession that followed have contributed to the bulk
166. Republicans Win House Majority, Make Senate Gains in Wave Election, FOXNEWS.COM
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/ll/02/poll-closing-key-east-coast-races-
balance-power-line/ (explaining that Republican candidates were "[r]iding a wave of voter frustra-
tion over the economy and federal government itself," and quoting the newly elected House Repub-
lican leader John Boehner as promising to fulfill the Republican pledge to cut government spending
and reduce the size of the federal government).
167. See Adam Nagourney, Bracingfor a Bailout Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at Al.
168. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2011, at Al.
169. Id; see also Peter Lattman, Holder Defends Efforts to Fight Financial Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, at BI (explaining that although President Obama announced his commitment
to combat financial fraud, the Justice Department has not pursued criminal cases against banking
executives involved in the 2008 global financial crisis).
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of the budget deficits that approximated $1.4 trillion in fiscal year 2009
and $1.3 trillion in fiscal year 2010.170 The increase in costs and decrease
in revenue are not sustainable. See Figure 8 below:
Figure 8. Factors Driving Budget Deficits, 2009-2019
Defidt, in trillions
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Reawery measures
Bush-era tax cuts TARP, Fannie, and Freddie
U Econorniedownturn
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- Deficit without
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Source: CBPP analyss based n Cong ressionat Budget Office estimates.
Center on Budget and Poliy Pririies I cbpparg
Source: Hearing on "Spend Less, Owe Less, Grow the Economy" Before the Joint Econ. Comm'
of the U.S. Cong., 112th Cong. 90 fig. 1 (2011) (testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr.
on Budget & Policy Priorities).
Although the deficits are projected to decrease in the near term, the net
effect of the economic downturn and governmental response was that we
reached our debt limit of $14.3 trillion in August 2011.17 1 This generated
a near impasse on raising the debt ceiling, with Republicans initially re-
fusing to raise the limit unless spending was cut.17 2 As a consequence of
170. Hearing on "Spend Less, Owe Less, Grow the Economy" Before the Joint Econ. Comm.
of the U.S. Cong., 112th Cong. 90 fig.1 (2011) (testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr. on
Budget & Policy Priorities).
171. Jackie Calmes & Carl Hulse, As the Federal Government Hits Its Debt Limit, Lawmakers
Spar over Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, at Al9 (explaining that the government reached its
debt limit in May 2011, but that due to "extraordinary measures," default would not occur until
approximately August 2, 2011).
172. See NIKOLA G. SwANN, STANDARD & POOR'S, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM
RATING LOWERED TO AA+ ON POLITICAL RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE 3
(2011) (explaining the position of Standard & Poor's that "the prolonged controversy over raising
the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress
containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on
raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful
process"); see also Damian Paletta & Matt Phillips, S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 6, 2011, at Al; ABC This Week (ABC television broadcast Apr. 25, 2010), available at
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the ensuing rancor, it is highly unlikely that substantial federal funds will
be available to alleviate continued unemployment or to stimulate
growth. 17 3
Whereas spending as a percentage of GDP has hovered around
20%-22% for the past three decades, in fiscal year 2009 it rose to
25%. 174 Similarly, revenues for the past three decades have hovered
around 18% of GDP but fell to 14.9% in fiscal year 2009.'7 Although it
has been fashionable to assert that we have a spending problem and not a
revenue problem,'76 the reality is that there is both a serious spending and
a serious revenue problem as a result of the financial crisis.
Warren Buffett's characterization of derivatives as "financial weap-
ons of mass destruction"17 7 has proved all too true. Moreover, the misal-
location of capital to risky mortgages instead of to productive investment
has devastated household net worth, 178 exacerbated household debt, and
crippled consumer spending as a vehicle out of our present malaise.179
Our economy cannot afford the mammoth "diversified" financial institu-
tions that we have permitted to conglomerate, and thereby create and
market the financial innovations that have privatized profit and social-
ized risk.
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-goolsbee-brown-corker/story?id=10469580 (fea-
turing Austan Goolsbee, member of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, and Senators
Bob Corker and Sherrod Brown).
173. President Obama signed into law the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat. 156, which extended the payroll tax reduction of two percentage
points and jobless benefits to cover between 63 and 73 weeks. See id. § 1001, 126 Stat. at 158-59.
However, additional fiscal stimulus or federal bailout money is extremely unlikely. See Annalyn
Censky & Charles Riley, What's in Obama's Stimulus Plan, CNNMONEY (Sept. 8, 2011, 9:39 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/08/news/economy/obama-stimulus plan/index.htm (explaining how
President Obama's recent proposal for $447 billion in fiscal stimulus "has almost no chance of
passing" the Republican-controlled House of Representatives).
174. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 24-25 tbl. 1.2 (2011).
175. Id.
176. David Weigel, "It's Not a Revenue Problem. It's a Spending Problem. ": Tracing the
History of a GOP Talking Point, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2011, 6:33 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2291530/ (quoting Speaker of the House John Boehner, Majority Leader
Eric Cantor, and Senator Orrin Hatch, each saying variations of the phrase "Washington does not
have a revenue problem. It's got a spending problem").
177. Paul B. Farrell, Derivatives the New 'Ticking Bomb,' WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH (Mar.
10, 2008, 7:31 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/derivatives-are-the-new-ticking-time-
bomb?print-true&dist=printTop (quoting Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman & CEO, Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., to Company Shareholders 15 (2002), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted). The use
of derivatives is alleged to have contributed to the current economic crisis in Europe because Greece
used derivatives developed by Goldman Sachs and other investment bankers to hide its shaky finan-
cial position. See Louise Story et al., Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe's Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at Al.
178. See JESSE BRICKER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BD., SURVEYING THE AFTERMATH OF THE
STORM: CHANGES IN FAMILY FINANCES FROM 2007 To 2009, at 1, 21-22 (2011).
179. Id. at 22.
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V. ARE BIG BANKS Too BIG?
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act was
supposed to end the problem of too big to fail by creating an orderly liq-
uidation authority (OLA) to provide the federal government with the
power to liquidate banks that have failed without jeopardizing the econ-
omy.80 This provision was designed to end taxpayers footing the bill
when a large institution failed. The Act specifically provides that compa-
nies put into receivership should be liquidated, that all funds expended in
the liquidation should be recovered from the assets of the company or
from the financial sector through assessments, and that no part of the
losses should be borne by the taxpayers. 8'
This sounds good. The era of privatizing profits and socializing
losses is supposedly over. However, not everyone accepts that premise.
For example, Standard & Poor's in 2011 opined, "[G]iven the im-
portance of confidence sensitivity in the effective functioning of banks,
we believe that under certain circumstances and with selected systemi-
cally important financial institutions .. ., future extraordinary govern-
ment support is still possible."' 82 The credit-rating agency also opined
that "implementation of OLA could increase uncertainty in the market at
a time when confidence needs boosting. For instance, dismantling a large
financial firm might spur creditors to pull out of other similar financial
firms in times of stress." 83 The report also noted that the history of gov-
ernmental support reflects a mindset that may not go away. This cyni-
cism was also reflected in a recent report by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas (the Dallas Fed), observing that it is difficult "to imagine political
leaders sticking to the anti-TBTF [too big to fail] guns, especially if they
face a too-many-to-fail situation again."' 84 Both reports agreed with
Chairman Greenspan that "[i]f they're too big to fail, they're too big."'85
A. How Big Is Too Big?
The above report by the Dallas Fed contrasted the change in con-
centration in the banking industry between 1970 and 2010.186 In 1970,
the five largest banks held 17% of banking assets, the next ninety-five
banks had 37% of assets, and the 12,500 smallest banks had 48% of as-
sets. By 2010, the share of the five largest banks had increased to 52%,
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
201-217, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442-1520 (2010).
181. Id. § 214, 124 Stat. at 1518.
182. RODRIGO QUINTANILLA ET AL., STANDARD & POOR'S, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SAYS
SUPPORT FOR BANKS WILL BE DIFFERENT "NEXT TIME"-BUT WILL IT? 2 (2011).
183. Id. at 3; see also supra text and accompanying notes 114-115 (discussing the effect of
Lehman Brothers's bankruptcy).
184. FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., CHOOSING THE ROAD TO PROSPERITY: WHY WE MUST
END TOO BIG TO FAIL-Now 20 (2011).
185. QUINTANILLA ET AL., supra note 182, at 10 (quoting Greenspan, supra note 1) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
186. FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., supra note 184, at 6-7.
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the share of the next ninety-five had dropped to 32%, and the share of the
5,700 smallest banks had plummeted to 16%. Thus, there was a shrink-
age in the number of banks and a tripling of the percentage of assets held
by the five largest banks. See Figure 9 below:
Figure 9. U.S. Banking Concentration Increased Dramatically
J
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Source: FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., CHOOSING THE ROAD TO PROSPERITY: WHY WE MUST END
Too BIG To FAIL-Now 6 (2011).
Another way to appreciate the growth of the big banks is compare
the growth of their assets to GDP. When Senator Sherrod Brown asserted
that the assets of the six largest banks in this country had grown from
17% of GDP fifteen years earlier to 63% of GDP, 18 7 PolitiFact compared
those numbers with data obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia (the Philadelphia Fed) and found that Senator Brown was
correct. The following is the data from the Philadelphia Fed: 1 8 8
187. 156 CONG. REC. 57, S2519 (daily ed., Apr. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Sherrod Brown);
see also ABC This Week, supra note 172.
188. Angie Drobnic Holan, Six Largest Banks Getting Bigger, Brown Said, POLITIFACT (Apr.
27, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/apr/27/sherrod-
brown/six-largest-banks-getting-bigger-brown-said/.
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Figure 10. Asset Concentration of Top Six U.S. Banks ($ in billions)
Assets as Assets as
of Dec. 31, of Dec. 31,
1994 2009
Citicorp $250.5 Bank of America $2,224.5
BankAmerica 215.5 JPMorgan Chase 2,032.0
Chemical Bank 171.4 Citigroup 1,856.6
Nationsbank 169.6 Wells Fargo 1,243.6
J.P. Morgan 154.9 Goldman Sachs 849.3
Chase Manhattan 114.0 Morgan Stanley 771.5
Top 6 Banks Total $1,075.9 Top 6 Banks Total $8,977.5
% of GDP 14.8% % of GDP 62.1%
Nominal GDP $7,248.2 Nominal GDP $14,453.8
Source: Angie Drobnic Holan, Six Largest Banks Getting Bigger, Brown Said, POLrrIFACT
(Apr. 27, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2010/apr/27/sherrod-brown/six-largest-banks-getting-bigger-brown-said/.
The June 30, 2011 listing of "large commercial banks" by the Fed-
eral Reserve reports the consolidated assets of JPMorgan Chase at $1.79
trillion, Bank of America at $1.45 trillion, Citibank at $1.22 trillion, and
Wells Fargo at $1.1 trillion.189 Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were
not listed in this group, apparently because they are investment banks
that only elected bank-holding-company status to access federal funds. 190
But U.S. Bank, the fifth-largest bank listed, has only $310 billion in con-
solidated assets, and there are only two other banks that have over $200
billion in assets. Clearly, the big banks dwarf the rest of the banking sys-
tem.
How did the big banks get so big? Other than Goldman Sachs, this
occurred by acquisition after acquisition, some of which were encour-
aged by the government during the financial crisis. The "Appendix" trac-
es the acquisition activity that led to this consolidation and indicates the
relative size of the combining financial entities in comparison to the
GDP of the United States. Most of the present big banks started at 1% to
2% of GDP but, through multiple acquisitions, now have reached 10% or
more of GDP.
189. FED. RESERVE, INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT HAVE
CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE, RANKED BY CONSOLIDATED ASSETS AS OF
JUNE 30, 2011, at 1 (2011).
190. Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan to Become Holding Companies, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2008), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2008-09-
21/news/30726602_lgoldman-and-morgan-morgan-stanley-Iloyd-blankfein.
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B. What Are the Consequences, or Lack Thereof of "Too Big to Fail"?
The big banks, by financing the non-bank lenders that created the
toxic mortgages that the big banks securitized into toxic securities, were
largely responsible for the financial crisis.1 9' And it was these big banks
that absorbed most of the initial bailout money and took advantage of
much of the minimal-interest money that the Fed made available.1 9 2 Un-
fortunately, these big banks, instead of lending to the small- and mid-
sized firms that are the engine of job creation,19 3 have diverted funds to
trading. The losses in the J.P. Morgan-London whale episode, in which
J.P. Morgan lost billions of dollars from trading activity,' 94 occurred in
the chief investment office. This office supposedly engaged in hedging
and cash management, operations which should not be profit centers.
Instead, J.P. Morgan turned it into a profit center by using depositors'
funds for trading rather than for lending.'95
But unlike the auto bailout, and the failure of smaller banks, there
were no consequences for the big banks and their management. As a
condition of receiving federal money, General Motors was required to
change its business plan, close some plants, renegotiate compensation
with employees, and replace its CEO.19 6 When smaller banks fail, the
FDIC imposes a conservatorship, and generally, their assets are sold to
another bank. Management is replaced, and shareholders lose their in-
vestment. On the other hand, although we have bailed out the big banks,
their management, which oversaw the actions that led to the crisis, is still
in place, and the traders who earned bonuses trading complex financial
products that helped sink the economy have kept their bonuses and have
continued to be rewarded handsomely.' 9 7 Shareholders have suffered
market-price losses, but have not been wiped out. Conversely, creditors
of financial institutions generally have not suffered, thus rewarding their
lack of due diligence in monitoring their loans. As long as government
191. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., supra note 184, at I ("[The big banks] were a primary
culprit in magnifying the financial crisis, and their presence continues to play an important role in
prolonging our economic malaise."); see also Murdock, supra note 9, at 1324.
192. Bradley Keoun et al., The Fed's Secret Liquidity Lifelines, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/data-visualization/federal-reserve-emergency-lending (last visited Jan.
6,2013).
193. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Mr. Banker, Can You Spare a Dime?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2011, at A21; see also 156 CONG. REC. 57, S2519-S2528 (daily ed., Apr. 21, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Sherrod Brown).
194. See supra 150-58 and accompanying text.
195. See JPMORGAN CHASE & Co., FINANCIAL RESULTS: 2Q12, at 14 (2012) (showing that
there were deposits of $1.116 trillion and loans of $693 billion, and that the chief investment office
made a total profit of almost $8 billion in 2009 and 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000248/jpmc2q12exhibit992.htm.
196. See Chris Isidore, GM Bankruptcy: End ofan Era, CNNMONEY (June 2, 2009, 4:03 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/01/news/companies/gm bankruptcy/.
197. See Stephen Gandel, How Washington's Bailout Will Boost Wall Street Bonuses, TIME
(Oct. 27,2008), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1853846,00.html.
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will bail out the banks, stakeholders can adopt a "what, me worry"-type
approach.
Two Nobel Prize-winning economists have argued that we should
have employed a conservatorship model to the big banks, rather than a
bailout model. 19 8 To President Obama's assertion that government own-
ership is not the American way, Professor Joseph Stiglitz responded:
But he was wrong: conservatorship, including the possibility of tem-
porary government ownership when all else failed, was the traditional
approach; the massive government gifts to banks were what was un-
precedented. Since even the banks that were taken over by the gov-
ernment were always eventually sold, some suggested that the pro-
cess be called preprivatization.199
Supporting Professor Stiglitz's argument, the FDIC lists almost 400
banks that have been placed in conservatorship or sold since September
2008.200
Although we tend to view the economic experience of other coun-
tries with disdain, the experience of Sweden could have been helpful. In
1991, Sweden did not let its banks slowly write off bad assets in the hope
that earnings, over time, would return them to solvency, which is basical-
ly what we have done. Rather, Sweden forced the banks to recognize
their losses and nationalized one-fifth of the banking system, which we
have done in the past with insolvent banks that were not too big to fail.201
As a result, the Swedish economy turned around in two years; 202 on the
other hand, our economy is still struggling.
In the current European crisis, Iceland essentially followed the
Swedish model, and Ireland rejected it. Iceland was an extreme example
of a banking system dwarfing the economy. Between 2002 and 2008, the
Icelandic banking system had grown to the point where its assets were
eleven times GDP. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy triggered the col-
lapse of Iceland's shaky banking system, and the Icelandic government
responded by seizing the banks, leaving the toxic assets with the old
banks, and setting up new ones with clean balance sheets, guaranteeing
only domestic deposits.203
198. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., All the President's Zombies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2009, 3:26
PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/all-the-presidents-zombies/.
199. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 116-17 (2010) (footnote omitted).
200. See Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
201. See id
202. See YALMAN ONARAN, ZOMBIE BANKS: How BROKEN BANKS AND DEBTOR NATIONS.
ARE CRIPPLING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 137-38 (2012).
203. Id. at 68.
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On the other hand, Ireland, fearing a capital flight, guaranteed the
obligations of its banks, whose assets represented twice Ireland's GDP.
As a result, the sovereign debt of Ireland increased to the point where
Ireland's solvency became questionable, and interest rates on the Irish
debt shot up. The European Central Bank opposed any losses on the sen-
ior debt. Consequently, the German banks and others who extended cred-
it to the Irish banks were bailed out by the Irish taxpayers, while the Irish
people bore the brunt of an austerity program that has kept the country in
-204
recession.
C. Why the Big Banks Should Be Broken Up
There is an incredible difference in size between the big banks and
the remainder of the banking system,2 05 which creates both political and
economic concerns arising from the power that untoward size provides.
The political implications have been evidenced by the lobbying efforts of
the big banks to undercut the provisions of the Dodd-Frank legislation.
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the financial services
industry has spent over $570 million on lobbying during the 2011-2012
election cycle.20 6 From an economic perspective, in 2009 the Center for
Economic and Policy Research estimated that the taxpayer subsidy for
large banks was about 60 basis points, or $34 billion a year, because of
the borrowing benefit that too big to fail gave these large banks.207 This,
in turn, gave them a substantial advantage over smaller banks. However,
a more recent 2012 study estimated that that the current lowered funding
costs for the big banks was now 80 basis points,208 and the editors of
Bloomberg News estimated that this provided the largest banks a $76
billion subsidy a year, which was roughly equivalent to the banks' total
profits over the four quarters prior to June 2012.209
In addition, Professor Rajan, in his working paper on financial in-
novation and riskiness that was scorned in 2005, pointed out some of the
anticompetitive aspects big banks enjoy because of their disparity in size:
204. Id. at 51-52.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 186-90.
206. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Interest Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/index.php (last updated Nov. 12, 2012).
207. See DEAN BAKER & TRAVIS MACARTHUR, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE
VALUE OF THE "TOO BIG TO FAIL" BIG BANK SUBSIDY 2 (2009). After the Continental Bank bailout
in 1984, the too big to fail syndrome created an implicit guarantee for large banks. But, after the
financial bailout in 2008, Sheila Bair, the head of the FDIC, stated that the guarantee, which had
been implicit, was now explicit and was giving large banks a competitive advantage. Paul Wiseman
& Pallavi Gogoi, Pressure Piles Up on Small Banks, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2009, at IB.
208. See Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 4, 12 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
12/128, 2012).
209. Dear Mr. Dimon, Is Your Bank Getting Corporate Welfare?, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2012,
5:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-18/dear-mr-dimon-is-your-bank-getting-
corporate-welfare-.html.
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As deregulation has increased competition for the best borrowers,
and shaved margins from offering "plain-vanilla" products to these
customers, large banks have reached out to nontraditional customers,
or to traditional customers with innovative products. 210
Because creation of these innovative products requires both large
amounts of capital and a high-priced staff of quants, it is only the big
banks that can offer such products. Thus, in addition to the too big to fail
borrowing subsidy, big banks are afforded another competitive ad-
vantage over other banks.
Professor Rajan also posited that executives are motivated to engage
in risky transactions that produce high returns with an apparently low
likelihood of risk even though the risk might be catastrophic. He refers to
this as the "Hidden Tail Risk."211 Consider Goldman Sachs's underwrit-
ing of the Abacus 2007-AC synthetic CDO, utilizing CDSs, which has
been previously discussed. Underwriting CDOs and CDSs has been high-
ly profitable. But after it was disclosed that the person who approached
Goldman about creating the synthetic CDO by writing CDSs against
pools of mortgages was an investor who wanted to bet against the real
estate market, a fact that was not disclosed to investors, Goldman agreed
to a $550 million settlement with the SEC,2 12 and faced the risk of suits
by investors. Moreover, the foregoing does not measure the cumulative
impact upon the economy as a whole of these improvident transactions.
Another example of catastrophic risk was AIG's issuance of CDSs.
Management viewed the "premium" it was paid for standing behind the
CDSs as almost "free money" because it never expected to pay out and
therefore held no reserves against potential loss. But when the mortgages
against which the CDSs were written began to default, AIG failed, and
the federal government bailed it out with over $100 billion.
As discussed earlier, Standard & Poor's was not convinced that the
federal government support for banks "[w]ill [b]e [d]ifferent '[n]ext
[t]ime"' 2 13 and opined that another bailout may be lurking in the future.
Professor Stiglitz has asserted that "[tihe financial sector used 'fear' to
persuade the administration to impose no controls, just as it used fear to
engineer the bondholder and shareholder protection schemes."2 14 If an
other crisis occurs, we can expect the big banks to employ fear once
again. In such circumstances, it is the rare politician who would have the
courage to run the risk of going against the big banks. This also is the
concern raised by the Dallas Fed.215 Since highly regarded economists
210. Rajan, supra note 100, at 6.
211. Id. at 3, 20.
212. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 149.
213. See QUINTANILLA ET AL., supra note 182, at 2.
214. STIGLITZ, supra note 199, at 124 n.24.
215. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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and institutions agree that "[i]f they're too big to fail, they're too big,"
the solution would seem to be to make them smaller (i.e., break them
up).
Supposedly, any bank is now limited in size to not having more than
10% of the nation's total bank deposits.216 But this ceiling has already
been breached.217 Because the 10% of deposits standard currently permits
mega-banks, it is too weak a standard. Professors Simon Johnson and
James Kwak argue that commercial banks should be limited in size to
4% of GDP and investment banks to 2%.218 With a GDP of approximate-
ly $14 trillion in 2010, commercial banks would be "limited" in size to
"only" $560 billion of assets. Although such a suggestion might appear
radical, this would not even restore the situation that existed in the 1990s,
before the spate of transactions outlined in the "Appendix." The econo-
my functioned quite well in the 1990s. To the argument that such a poli-
cy would inhibit innovation, one might respond that millions of unem-
ployed workers would be better off if the financial innovation of the
2000s had never come to pass.
Although some might argue that it is not feasible to break up the big
banks, interestingly, Reuters has already proposed a scenario for break-
ing up Goldman. 2 19 The suggestion was predicated upon trying to max-
imize shareholder value since Goldman's shares were trading at de-
pressed levels. The article suggested separating Goldman's investment
banking unit, the asset management unit, and the institutional client ser-
vices arm. Supposedly, the pieces could be worth more than the whole.
The Reuters proposal followed a more extensive analysis by
ProPublica, which argued that "breakups that seemed politically impos-
sible [are] no longer unthinkable." 22 0 The biggest barrier to such
breakups is the resistance of top management, who would earn less in
smaller institutions.22 1 Although the banks' diversified product and ser-
vice offerings can enhance profits by allowing cross-selling opportuni-
ties, such diversification, and the conflicts of interest inherent in it, do
not assure that clients are receiving the best services or the best deals.
216. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e)(2)(E)(ii) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 12 U.S.C. 1828(c)(13)(A)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i)(8)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
217. Merging Banks Surge Past U.S. Deposit Cap, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 17,2008,8:06
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/merging-banks-surge-past-us-deposit-cap/; see also
James Kwak, Banks and the 10% Deposit Cap, 13 BANKERS (Mar. 18, 2010),
http://13bankers.com/2010/03/18/banks-and-the-I0-deposit-cap/.
218. JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 15, at 216-17.
219. See Rob Cox, Breaking Up Could Be Good for Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/business/breaking-up-could-be-good-for-goldman.html.
220. Jesse Eisinger, Once Unthinkable, Breakup of Big Banks Seems Feasible, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (July 27, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/once-unthinkable-breakup-of-
big-banks-now-seems-feasible/.
221. Id.
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In 2011, additional support for breaking up the big banks came from
Herb Allison, the former chief executive officer of Merrill Lynch and
assistant secretary of treasury in the Obama Administration, who argued
that breaking up the big banks would reduce complexity and risk.222 In
particular, the smaller resulting entities would be easier to understand
and control, thereby permitting realistic oversight by the boards of direc-
tors of the resulting entities. The cost of integrating, operating, and modi-
fying the complex systems in the conglomerated big banks would be
reduced by removing organizational layers and coordination. Each new
segment would need to acquire its own funding, which would lead to
better assessment of capital and liquidity needs, and the various risks
involved. Equally important, such breakups would eliminate the conflicts
of interest that are inherent in these large, multifaceted institutions.
Nonetheless, there was not much momentum to take on the big
banks. For a time, major regulators were silent on this issue. Then, in
March 2012, the Dallas Fed released its 2011 Annual Report,223 in which
the president of the Dallas Fed noted "an already dangerous trend of in-
creasing banking industry concentration" and concluded that "[i]t is im-
perative that we end TBTF [too big to fail]. In my view, downsizing the
behemoths over time into institutions that can be prudently managed and
regulated across borders is the appropriate policy response."224 Following
up on this policy position, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Presi-
dent James Bullard stated, "I would back my colleague (Dallas Fed Pres-
ident) Richard Fisher in saying that we should split up the largest
banks."2 25 He added:
We do not need these companies to be as big as they are. The regula-
tory system would be much simpler if large firms were broken up, ra-
ther than trying to write complicated rules to capture all of the poten-
tial risks at complex firms . ... It would be simpler to have smaller
institutions so that they could fail if they need to fail .. 226
Bullard also supported the so-called Volcker rule on the basis that
"[y]ou shouldn't be taking insured deposits and be unrestricted in your
activities with these insured deposits." 22 7 Although the Volcker amend-
ments to Dodd-Frank do not reincarnate Glass-Steagall, they do limit
the amount of proprietary trading in which financial institutions can en-
222. See Herbert M. Allison, THE MEGABANKS MESS 658 (2011), available at
http://www.amazon.com/Megabanks-Mess-Kindle-Single-ebook/dp/BO05 I GQX 1l.
223. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., supra note 184.
224. Id at 1.
225. See Feds Bullard: Breakup J.P. Morgan, Big Banks, REUTERS (May 17, 2012, 3:47 PM),
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/17/usa-fed-bullard-banks-
idUSLI E8GHC6620120517.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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228gage. This can itself encourage financial institutions to break them-
selves up by spinning off trading activities, assuming the regulations
presently in process do not emasculate the limitations on trading. Former
Fed Chairman Paul Volcker offered a clear choice to financial institu-
tions heavily involved in trading: "[G]ive up either their proprietary trad-
ing activity or their banking license."229
What Dodd-Frank did not accomplish directly-namely, breaking
up the big banks-it may accomplish indirectly by requiring banks to
create "living wills." According to former FDIC Chairperson Sheila Bair:
These rules [with respect to living wills] require that big banks map
their business lines to their legal entities. So, for instance, Chase and
others would have to identify the legal entities that support their in-
vestment-banking operations, their trading and brokerage activities,
their commercial and retail lending, and so forth. The idea is to have
a credible breakup plan in place if they get into trouble. Meaningful
enforcement of this rule and public disclosure of the plans would
help to convince the market that too-big-to-fail is over. It would also
help shareholders figure out how to start breaking up the Goliaths.230
Although it might not have been surprising that some present and
former regulators would advocate the breakup of the big banks, the fi-
nancial community was taken aback when Sandy Weill, the former
chairman and CEO of Citigroup, asserted that the big banks should be
broken up and commercial and investment banking separated. 231 Weill
was the architect of the mega-bank one-stop-shopping model who or-
228. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-30 (2010).
229. PAUL A. VOLCKER, COMMENTARY ON THE RESTRICTIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING BY
INSURED DEPOSITARY INSTITUTIONS 3 (2012). Chairman Volcker points out the risks of proprietary
trading:
On its face, proprietary trading entails substantial risks. It is essentially speculative in
nature: securities are bought, held and sold in the expectation of profits from changes in
market prices. The recent years of financial crisis have seen spectacular trading losses in
large commercial and investment banks here and abroad operating on an international
scale, with various loss estimates for major international commercial and investment
banks ranging to hundreds of billions of dollars.
Id. at 2. Then, and equally important, Volcker highlights the impact such trading has on the
culture of banking:
The need to restrict proprietary trading is not only, or perhaps most importantly, a
matter of the immediate market risks involved. It is the seemingly inevitable implication
for the culture of the commercial banking institutions involved, manifested in the huge
incentives to take risk inherent in the compensation practices for the traders. Can one
group of employees be so richly rewarded, the traders, for essentially speculative, imper-
sonal, short-term trading activities while professional commercial bankers providing es-
sential commercial banking services to customers, and properly imbued with fiduciary
values, be confined to a much more modest structure of compensation?
Id.
230. Sheila Bair, Breaking Up Chase: Good for Shareholders and Taxpayers, CNNMONEY
(May 25, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/25/jp-morgan-chase-breakup/.
231. Wall Street Legend Sandy Weill: Break Up the Big Banks, CNBC.cOM (July 25, 2012,
8:02 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48315170/WallStreetLegendSandyWeillBreak Up the BigBanks.
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chestrated the merger of Travelers Insurance and Citicorp when he was
chairman of Travelers.232 He also was a leading advocate for the repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated commercial banking and
investment banking activities. 233 John Reed, the CEO of Citicorp at the
time of the Travelers merger, has also acknowledged the need to break
up the big banks, stating: "It wasn't that there was one or two institutions
that, you know, got carried away and did stupid things. It was, we all did
... and then the whole system came down."234
But the simplest and surest way to deal with the oversized institu-
tions that are not only too big to fail, but also too big and complex to
manage, is to impose objective size limits of the sort suggested by John-
son and Kwak and give management a fixed period of time to come into
compliance. The benefits, as discussed above, are manifold: less com-
plexity, easier monitoring by the market and creditors, reduced conflicts
of interest, stronger ties with local economies, more competition, less
innovation focused on creating incomprehensible financial instruments,
and more innovation focused upon servicing manufacturing and the real
economy.
D. Regulators Need to Regulate
Politics should not infect the actions of the Federal Reserve Board.
But the Fed Chairman is appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate.235 Although the appointment of the Chairman should not be polit-
icized, the lessons of the past decade should make it clear that a libertari-
an ideologue is not the proper person to be in charge of economic policy.
Professor David Moss of Harvard Business School has suggested
that it was the success of the New Deal legislation that lulled us into
complacency and made financial regulation seem to be an "unnecessary
burden." 236 This legislation provided fifty years of stability for the finan-
cial system when, prior thereto, there was a financial crisis every fifteen
to twenty years. He analogized the situation to public health: after sharp-
ly reducing deadly epidemics through public health measures, should
policy makers abandon these measures because major epidemics are not
a problem anymore? He offered the following perspective on the past
three decades:
232. Mitchell Martin, Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record $70 Billion Deal: A
New No. 1; Financial Giants Unite, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/07/news/07iht-citi.t.html.
233. See Jed Horowitz & David Henry, Weill Changes Mind, Calls for Big Banks to Break Up,
REUTERS, July 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/25/us-citigroup-weill-
idUSBRE860 I M220120725.
234. Id. (alteration in original).
235. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Nov.
2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed46.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
236. David A. Moss, An Ounce offPrevention, HARV. MAG., Sept. 2009, at 26 fig. 1.
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The magnitude of the current financial crisis reflects the failure of an
economic and regulatory philosophy that proved increasingly influ-
ential in policy circles during the past three decades. This philosophy,
guided more by theory than historical experience, held that private
financial institutions not insured by the government could be largely
trusted to manage their own risks-to regulate themselves. The crisis
has suggested otherwise, particularly since several of the least regu-
lated parts of the system (including non-bank mortgage originators
and the major broker-dealer Bear Steams) were among the first to run
into trouble.237
As earlier parts of this Article have documented, the regulatory fail-
ures in the Reagan and Bush 41 Administrations with regard to the sav-
ings and loan crisis, the regulatory failures in the Clinton Administration
with respect to derivatives, and the wholesale failures in the Bush 43
Administration among all the banking regulators and the SEC have had a
devastating impact upon our economy. This should not be a liberal ver-
sus conservative, or Republican versus Democrat, issue. In fact, two of
the wisest regulators were conservative Republican women, Brooksley
23Born, who saw the danger in derivatives,238 and Sheila Bair, who viewed
the implicit government guarantee provided to the too big to fail banks,
and the subsidy it provides, as unfair to the rest of the banking system
and a threat to financial security.239 It may be that sex is a better test of
good judgment than party affiliation.
Joe Nocera, the highly respected financial journalist, in reviewing
Sheila Bair's efforts to get other regulators to take the subprime mort-
gage practices seriously and to cajole the banks to modify the ARMs that
were resetting at levels that homeowners could not afford, concluded:
My own view is the country would have been far better served if
more people in positions of power had been willing to listen to her as
the financial crisis unfolded. Hers was a voice of common sense, try-
ing to protect the taxpayer, the bank depositor and the homeowner. If
other regulators had taken her early subprime concerns seriously-to
cite just one example-the financial world might be a different place
today.240
Ms. Bair was labeled as "difficult" because she viewed her role as pro-
tecting depositors and taxpayers, rather than bankers and bondholders. 241
But protecting depositors and taxpayers is the function given to the FDIC
by Congress. Policy should be fact-driven, not ideology-driven. It should
be clear that persons aligned with an industry, or whose basic premise is
237. Id. at 25.
238. See Goodman, supra note 80.
239. Joe Nocera, Sheila Bair's Bank Shot, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011, at M24.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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that government is not the solution but rather the problem cannot be ex-
pected to put the public interest first as regulators.
A serious problem is that our financial regulators frequently come
from the financial industry, and often go back to it. There are those in the
financial services industry who realize the necessity and benefits of regu-
lation. But there are also ideologues who do not, who have a structural
bias, and who are imbued with a limited perspective. Although regulators
with expertise are needed, care should be taken to ensure that they are
not ideologues. Former Treasury Secretary Paulson, who proposed the
bank bailout and sought to extract no conditions in return, was previously
the CEO of Goldman Sachs. Robert Rubin, the Secretary of Treasury in
the Clinton Administration became the CEO of Citigroup. These are just
two examples which illustrate the danger that regulators' private sector
interests may override the broader concerns they should have in their
governmental roles. The problem of the movement betwecn industry and
government has been extensively documented.2 4 2
All goods have their costs. There is no free lunch. If financial insti-
tutions want government insurance or government guarantees, then the
price is regulation. As Professor Robert Reich has asserted in tracing the
decline of the middle class in America:
Most telling of all, Washington deregulated Wall Street while insur-
ing it against major losses. In so doing, it allowed finance-which
until then had been the servant of American industry-to become its
master, demanding short-term profits over long-term growth and rak-
ing in an ever larger portion of the nation's profits. By 2007, finan-
cial companies accounted for over 40 percent of American corporate
profits and almost as great a percentage of pay, up from 10 percent
during the Great Prosperity. 243
Unless we implement effective regulation, we are doomed to repeat the
failures of the 2000s, where profit was privatized and risk was socialized.
We will also be stuck with a no-growth economy in which resources
flow from the economy into the banks instead of from the banks into the
economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the Great Depression, from the passage of Glass-Steagall in
1933 until the 1980s, relatively few banks failed. The safety and solven-
cy of financial institutions was taken for granted. From the end of WWII
until the 1970s was also a period of unmatched general prosperity. The
1970s represented a somewhat discordant note, as the economy slowed
and inflation ensued.
242. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92-97.
243. See Reich, supra note 30.
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In 1980, a new ethic arose: government is not the solution, govern-
ment is the problem. This ushered in almost three decades of deregula-
tion. Very quickly came the savings and loan crisis, in part driven by the
problem of having assets long and liabilities short, but also exacerbated
by deregulation. Also, at this time, antitrust enforcement fell out of
vogue, and a wave of bank mergers began in the 1990s. This resulted in
the six big banks today that are too big to fail. The deregulatory mindset
of the Clinton Administration ignored the lethal potential of derivatives,
and the libertarian instincts of former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan and the Bush 43 Administration were blind to the dangers of
financial innovation.
The big banks financed the origination of subprime and other toxic
mortgages that Chairman Greenspan extolled as financial innovation.
The banks then secuntized these toxic mortgages and induced the credit-
rating agencies to give them AAA ratings. Mortgage underwriting stand-
ards were nonexistent and liars' loans became a norm. Securities due
diligence fell by the wayside, and when the toxic mortgages began to
default, the economy of the United States imploded. Today, we are still
witnessing the impact of these "instruments of mass destruction." 24
We are in the throes of the worst economy since the Great Depres-
sion. Like the Great Depression and unlike recessions after it, the plunge
in the current economy was caused not by business cyclicality but by the
failure of the banking system. And the failure of the banking system to
modify mortgages that are underwater, rather than foreclose on them
(sometimes with dubious documentation), has lengthened the downturn
and continues to depress the housing market.2 4 5 The function of the bank-
ing system is to intermediate capital and channel it into productive in-
vestments. To the contrary, it has consumed capital, misallocated capital,
and created a real estate bubble that collapsed. Although most bailout
money has been repaid, the banks have not been held to account for the
devastating losses they have inflicted on the economy as a whole and, in
particular, on average citizens who have lost their homes and their jobs.
All the blame cannot be placed on the banking sector. Regulation,
or rather lack of it, has been driven by an ideology that markets are al-
ways self-correcting and that acting in your own perceived best interest
will always be good for the economy as a whole. This philosophy has
created tremendous wealth for the few and left the many economically
244. See Farrell, supra note 177 (quoting Letter from Warren Buffett, supra note 177) (internal
quotation marks omitted). I have taken the liberty of expanding Buffett's concerns to include other
financial innovations, such as subprime loans and pick-a-pay loans.
245. Although there is an impression today that the housing market may be recovering, part of
this is due to the fact that banks are holding many foreclosed properties off the market in order not to
further depress the market. See Foreclosed Homes Being Kept off Market by Banks: Santa Monica,
SELECT REAL ESTATE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.select-realestate.com/2012/12/foreclosed-
homes-being-kept-off-market-by-banks-santa-monica/.
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regressing. The deregulatory mindset at the Fed and the Bush Admin-
istration had disastrous consequences for the economy and the average
American. But the timidity and deference to the banking industry of
banking regulators, with the exception of two women, has been less than
exemplary.
What has the past taught and what does the future offer? Apparent-
ly, many have learned little from the past because Dodd-Frank is at-
tacked as excessive regulation when, in reality, it did not go far enough.
Supposedly the era of too big to fail is over; however, this is not a view
held by, for example, Standard & Poor's, which has indicated its concern
that future bailouts may be in the offing. Nor did Dodd-Frank adequately
deal with the misaligned incentives that motivated bank management to
take catastrophic risks.
Chairman Greenspan's opinion that "[i]f they're too big to fail,
[then] they're" too big" is beginning to gather some momentum. Wheth-
er the political will exists to break up the banks is questionable, but their
depressed stock prices, Dodd-Frank's living-will provisions, and the
Volcker rule may provide an impetus for the market to demand such ac-
tion. Irrespective of whether that happens, the mentality that "govern-
ment is not the solution, government is the problem" must change.
VII. APPENDIX: CONSOLIDATION HISTORY OF THE BIG BANKS
Year Consolidation Activity
JPMorgan Chase
1991 * Chemical Bank merged with Manufacturers Hano-
ver.246
1995 * First Chicago merged with National Bank of De-
troit.247
1996 * Chemical Bank (assets valued at 1.98% of GDP) 248
merged with Chase Manhattan (assets valued at
1.35% of GDP).249
1998 * In 1998, Bank One merged with First Chicago (as-
sets valued at 0.70% of GDP).250
246. Michael Quint, The Bank Merger; Big Bank Merger to Join Chemical, Manufacturers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, at Al.
247. Stephanie Strom, First Chicago and NBD to Merge as Banks Scurry to Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1995, at DI.
248. Bank assets as a percentage of GDP at the time of consolidation obtained by dividing each
respective bank's total assets by national GDP in that year. Total assets were retrieved from Institu-
tion Directory, FDIC.GOv, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2013), by per-
forming a database search for the bank in question and running a report for the relevant year. GDP
information based on "Current-Dollar and 'Real' GDP" chart from Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
U.S. DEP'T OF COM. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/nationaU (last visited Jan. 6,
2013).
249. Saul Hansell, Banking's New Giant: The Deal; Chase and Chemical Agree to Merge in
$10 Billion Deal Creating Largest U.S. Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al. For calculation of
assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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Year Consolidation Activity
2000 * In 2000, J.P. Morgan (assets valued at 0.70% of
GDP) 25 1 merged with Chase Manhattan (assets val-
ued at 1.00% of GDP).252
2004 * In 2004, JPMorgan Chase (assets valued at 5.64% of,
GDP) 25 3 merged with Bank One (assets valued at
2.30% of GDP).2 54
2008 * In 2008, J.P. Morgan (assets valued at 9.40% of
GDP) 25 5 acquired Bear Stearns 256 and Washington
Mutual.257
Citigroup
1988 * Commercial Credit purchased Primerica (which
owned Smith Barney).2 58 These companies kept the
name Primerica.
1993 * Primerica merged with Travelers Insurance and took
the name Travelers, Inc.259
1997 * Travelers, Inc. purchased Salomon Brothers.260
1998 * Citicorp merged with Travelers, Inc. to form
Citigroup Inc. (assets of Citibank valued at 3.22% of
GDP).26
2006 * Citigroup (assets valued at 5.60% of GDP) 262 con-
solidated its branches in the West (assets valued at
1.04% of GDP). 263
Goldman Sachs
Post-1990 * No mergers found after 1990.
250. Banc One-First Chicago Merger Clears Hurdle, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 1998), at Bus. 3.
For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
251. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
252. Chris Isidore, Chase Buying J.P. Morgan: Stock Deal Valued by Firms at $33B Joins Two
of Banking's Biggest Names, CNNMONEY (Sept. 13, 2000, 2:46 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2000/09/13/deals/chase morgan/. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see
supra note 248.
253. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
254. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas, Jr., Banking Giant: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2004, at Al.
255. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
256. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, JPMorgan Chase to Acquire Bear Steams (Mar. 16,
2008), http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=299805.
257. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of
Washington Mutual (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr)8085.html.
258. Robert J. Cole, 2 Leading Financiers Will Merge Companies in $1.65 Billion Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at Al.
259. Michael Quint, Travelers Approves Merger Offer by Primerica, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1993, at DI.
260. Salomon Succumbs at Last, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 25, 1997), at 79-80.
261. Travelers, Citicorp to Unite, CNNMONEY (Apr. 6, 1998, 2:07 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/1 998/04/06/deals/travelers/. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra
note 248.
262. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
263. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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Year Consolidation Activity
Bank of America
1992 * BankAmerica acquired Security Pacific Corpora-
tion,264 along with other regional banks.
1994 * BankAmerica acquired the Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago.265
1997 * BankAmerica (assets valued at 1.64% of GDP) 2 66
was acquired by NationsBank with the new entity
retaining the name "Bank of America Corpora-
11267tion.
2004 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
6.51% of GDP) 2 68 purchased FleetBoston Financial
(assets valued at 0.33% of GDP).2 69
2006 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
8.57% of GDP) 2 7 0 purchased MBNA (assets valued
at 0.06% of GDP).271
2006 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
9.36% of GDP) 27 2 purchased the United States Trust
Company from Charles Schwab Corporation (assets
valued at 0.09% of GDP) 2 73 and LaSalle Bank Cor-
poration from ABN Amro (assets valued at 0.78% of
GDP).274
2008 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
10.55% of GDP) 275 acquired Countrywide Fi-
nancial Corporation (assets valued at 0.08% of
GDP) 2 76 and Merrill Lynch & Co. (assets valued
at 0.72% of GDP).277
264. Andrew Pollack, The Bank Merger; BankAmerica in $4 Billion Deal to Acquire Rival
Security Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at Al.
265. Saul Hansell, 2 Banks Set $1.9 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, § 1, at 135.
266. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
267. Mitchell Martin, Nations Bank Drives $62 Billion Merger: A New BankAmerica: Biggest
of U.S. Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at DIO. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra
note 248.
268. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
269. Riva D. Atlas, Banking Giants: The Overview; Bank ofAmerica and FleetBoston Agree to
Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at Al. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note
248.
270. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
271. Krysten Crawford, Bank ofAmerica Inks $35B Card Deal, CNNMONEY (June 30, 2005,
4:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/30/news/fortune500/boa/. For calculation of assets-to-
GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
272. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
273. Josh Lipton, Bank ofAmerica to Buy U.S. Trust, FORBES.COM (Nov. 20, 2006, 5:02 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/20/bank-of-america-markets-equity-cxjli_1120marketsl2.html. For
calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
274. Matt Krantz, Barclays Makes $91B Offer for ABN Amro Biggest Banking Deal Ever
Could Spur Other Mergers, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2007, at I B. For calculation of assets-to-GDP
ratio, see supra note 248.
275. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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Year
Morgan Stanley
Consolidation Activity
1991 * Morgan Stanley acquired Quilter & Co., but sold it
in 2006.
1996 * Morgan Stanley acquired Van Kampen American
Capital. 278
2004 * Morgan Stanley acquired Canary Wharf Group.
2009 * Morgan Stanley acquired 51% of Smith Barney
from Citigroup and is now operating under the name
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney.2 79
Wells Fargo
1996 * Wells Fargo (assets valued at 0.66% of GDP) 28 0
merged with First Interstate Bancorp (assets valued
at 0.60% of GDP).281
1998 * Wells Fargo merged with Norwest and assumed the
name Wells Fargo & Company.282
1999 * Wells Fargo purchased thirteen companies during
the year with assets totaling $2.4 billion.
2000 * Wells Fargo purchased Michigan Financial Corpora-
tion, National Bancorp of Alaska, Inc., First Com-
merce Bancshares, Inc., Ragen MacKenzie Group,
Inc., and First Security Corporation.
2008 * Wells Fargo (assets valued at 4.37% of GDP) 2 83
purchased Wachovia Corporation (assets valued at
3.66% of GDP).284
276. Bank of America to Acquire Countrywide, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 11, 2008, 2:55 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22606833/ns/business-real-estate/t/bank-america-acquire-
countrywide/. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
277. Binyamin Appelbaum & David Cho, Bank of America Agrees to Buy Merrill During
Frenzied Weekend, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at AOl. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see
supra note 248.
278. Van Kampen Nearing Sale to Morgan Stanley, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1996, at Bus. 1.
279. Press Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley and Citi to Form Industry-Leading
Wealth Management Business Through Joint Venture (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/af3e409a-elb7-l I dd-84e6-b390c77322d3.html.
280. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
281. Saul Hansell, Wells Fargo Wins Battle for First Interstate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at
DI. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
282. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Approves Norwest/Wells Fargo
Merger After Parties Agree to $1.18 Billion Divestiture (Oct. 13, 1998),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/I 998/1984.htm.
283. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
284. Edward Iwata, Bank Strife Likely to Spark Mergers, Asset Sales, USA TODAY, Oct. 13,
2008, at 3B. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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